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Fair Use For Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?  
Jane C. Ginsburg, Columbia University School of Law * 
Forthcoming, Berkeley Technology Law Journal 
Abstract 
Fair use is an on/off switch: Either the challenged use is an infringement 
of copyright, or it is a fair use, which Section 107 declares “is not an 
infringement of copyright.”  As a result, either the copyright owner can 
stop the use, or the user not only is dispensed from obtaining permission, 
but also owes no compensation for the use.  The unpaid nature of fair use 
introduces pressures that may distort analysis, particularly of the 
“transformative” character of the use, and of potential market harm.  
Faced with a use, particularly in the context of new technologies, that a 
court perceives to be socially beneficial, a court may overemphasize its 
“transformativeness,” and correspondingly underestimate the market 
consequences, in order to prevent the copyright owner from frustrating the 
social benefit.  Distortions can appear in the other direction as well: A 
court sensitive to the economic consequences of the unpaid use may feel 
obliged to downplay the public interest fostered by the use.  Statutory 
licenses or privately negotiated accords within a statutory framework can 
alleviate the tension, by ensuring that uses that the legislator perceives to 
be in the public interest proceed free of the copyright owner’s veto, but 
with compensation – in other words, “Permitted but Paid.”    
 
The United States is an outlier in the broader international landscape of 
copyright exceptions.  The copyright laws of EU member states, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand do not include an all-purpose fair use defense 
(though one has been proposed in Australia), but all these states have 
enacted a panoply of copyright exceptions, many of which require 
remuneration.  Thus, while our fair use doctrine confronts courts with an 
all-or-nothing choice, other countries have charted middle courses 
between barring the use and permitting its unremunerated pursuit.   
 
In contending that some uses previously ruled “fair” should not remain 
unpaid, I argue that the copyright law should distinguish new distributions 
                                                     
* Many thanks for research assistance to Trey Brewer, Arjun Jaikumar and Olena 
Ripnick, all Columbia Law School class of 2014.  Thanks also for observations and 
criticisms to June Besek, Jack Browning, Irene Calboli, David Carson, Jacqueline 
Charlesworth, Susy Frankel, Wendy Gordon, Brad Greenberg, Lital Helman, Yafit Lev-
Aretz, Jessica Litman, Tony Reese, Paul Spera, Eva Subotnik and Edouard Treppoz, and 
to Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Christopher Yoo and the participants in the University of 
Pennsylvania copyright colloquium; to Jennifer Rothman and Jay Dougherty and the 
participants in the Loyola LA law school faculty workshop, and to my colleagues at the 
Columbia Law School faculty workshop.  Much gratitude to Barton Beebe for sharing his 
database of fair use cases. 
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from new works, and should confine (free) “fair use” to the latter.  I 
propose that many redistributive uses be “Permitted but Paid,” and be 
subject to a statutory framework for license negotiations, with compulsory 
licensing as a backstop.  “Permitted but Paid” uses may be divided into 
two classes: Subsidy (socially worthy redistributions); and Market Failure 
(transactions costs are too high to warrant a licensing solution; or a new 
mode of dissemination – infant industry – is threatened by copyright 
owner recalcitrance).  Because the inclusion of a use within the Market 
Failure class turns largely on facts that may evolve, these uses’ 
classification as “Permitted but Paid” should be subject to a phase-out, for 
example, a renewable sunset following a five-year review by the 
Copyright Office. 
 
Where the use confers a public benefit and the choice is all-or-nothing, a 
fair use outcome is assured.  But were “Permitted but Paid” an option, we 
would not be lured by a dichotomy falsely pitting authors against a 
perceived social good: The licensing mechanism would allow both 
broader dissemination and provide payment to authors.  One might rejoin 
that there is no need to license if the use is fair.   But if the use is “fair” 
because it supposedly cannot reasonably be licensed, then “Permitted but 
Paid” should replace fair use for free. 
 
Introduction 
The Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios
1 fended a fork in the fair use road.  It was the first case, apart from 
the Court of Claims decision a decade earlier in Williams & Wilkins v. 
U.S.,2 to hold that copying an entire work for the same purpose as the 
original, i.e., with no additional authorship contribution, could be a fair 
use, and therefore “free” in both senses of the word.  Prior fair use cases 
concerned new creativity; fair use developed in the context of what had 
been called “productive use”3 to enable new expression, not new 
distribution.   
 In prior controversies involving new modes of dissemination, 
courts wary of copyright owner motives (to enforce copyright in order to 
put a new entrant out of business) interpreted the scope of exclusive rights 
                                                     
1
 Sony Corp of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) 
2
 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).  
3
 See Sony Corp of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that commonly recognized examples of fair use 
“reflect[] a common theme: each is a productive use, resulting in some added benefit to 
the public beyond that produced by the first autor’s work”). 
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narrowly to find no prima facie infringement.4  By contrast, copying and 
retention of an entire work seem clearly to give rise to a prima facie claim 
of infringement.5  Fair use therefore affords the remaining safety valve.  
The social or technological pressure that courts may sense to permit the 
use may contribute to the notorious unpredictability of fair use in the U.S.6  
Of course, any rule that privileges flexibility necessarily produces 
unpredictability.  The greater the former, the greater also the latter.   
But there may be an additional reason.  Fair use is an on/off 
switch: all or nothing.  Either the challenged use is an infringement of 
copyright, or it is a fair use, which section 107 declares “is not an 
infringement of copyright.”7  As a result, either the copyright owner can 
stop the use,8 or the user not only is dispensed from obtaining permission, 
but also owes no compensation for the use.  The unpaid nature of fair use 
introduces pressures that may distort analysis, particularly of the 
“transformative” character of the use,9 and of potential market harm.  
Faced with a use, particularly in the context of new technologies, that a 
court perceives to be socially beneficial, a court may overemphasize its 
“transformativeness,” and correspondingly underestimate the market 
                                                     
4
 See, e.g., White-Smith v. Apollo, 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908) (piano roll not a “copy” and 
therefore no violation of reproduction right); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists 
Television, 392 U.S. 398--402 (1968) (antenna television retransmissions are not public 
performances as a matter of law); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974)  (cable retransmissions held not public performances).  
5
 Though one might dispute who makes the copy, e.g., Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. 
CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008); Fox Broadcasting Corp. v. Dish Network 
L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013). 
6
   Laments about the indeterminacy and unpredictability of fair use are legion, see, e.g., 
Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright §12.1 (2013); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, 
Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1569 (2009); James Gibson, 
Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 Yale L. J. 882 at 
889 (2007); David Nimmer, “Fairest of them All” And Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use,” 66 
L. & Contemp. Probs. 263, 287 (2003); Pierre N. Leval, Towards a Fair Use Standard, 
103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1106 (1990). Contra (fair use in practice is not so unpredictable), 
e.g., Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 Ohio St. L.J. 47 (2012); Pamela Samuelson, 
Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2537 (2009). Most of the examples discussed 
in these articles, however, concern new creativity rather than new distribution. 
7 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an 
infringement of copyright.”). 
8 But see suggestions, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 578 n. 10 (1993) and 
Stewart v. Abend, 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988), aff’d, 495 U.S. 207  (1990), that 
the appropriate remedy may be monetary, in effect, judicially imposed compulsory 
licenses; the defendants in those cases, however, produced new works of authorship, they 
did not merely redistribute the underlying work as is. 
9 Recent fair use case law suggests that once the use is deemed “transformative” it 
becomes presumptively “fair.” See infra notes 53—59 and accompanying text (discussing 
domination of “transformative” finding in fair use analysis); see also, e.g., Neri v Monroe 
11-cv-429-slc (W.D. Wisc. Feb. 26, 2014). 
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consequences, in order to prevent the copyright owner from frustrating the 
social benefit.10  Distortions can appear in the other direction as well: A 
court sensitive to the economic consequences of the unpaid use may feel 
obliged to downplay the public interest fostered by the use.11  Statutory 
licenses or privately-negotiated accords within a statutory framework can 
alleviate the tension, by ensuring that uses which the legislator perceives 
to be in the public interest proceed free of the copyright owner’s veto, but 
with compensation.   
In contending that some uses previously ruled “fair” should not 
remain unpaid, I argue that the copyright law should distinguish new 
distributions from new works, and should confine (free) “fair use” to the 
latter.  (I deliberately avoid the term “transformative,” which I believe has 
obscured analysis ever since courts began to attach that label to “uses” unmoored 
from “works.”)  Exploitations within the former group would fall into a 
new category, “Permitted but Paid,” or would be ruled infringing, and 
therefore left to resolution in the marketplace. 
 This project does not propose any change to the analysis of fair use 
cases involving new creativity.12  Analytical difficulties may abound there 
as well (for example, how much copying is too much; where lies the line 
between a fair use parody and an infringing derivative work), but they 
arise in the strongest normative universe for free use.13  The situations I 
intend to address often come down to assessing whether a new use should 
be exempted from copyright liability in order to enable a new business 
model, or to ensure relatively inexpensive dissemination in furtherance of 
socially worthy goals such as non-profit education.  The normative claims 
underlying redistributive uses are not based on authorship, but rather on 
“information policy,” a notion which may cover both the interests of 
                                                     
10 E.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. 
Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10 v. Yandex, 2013 WL 
1899851 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 
11 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d 828 (C.D.Cal. 2006), rev’d in part, 
Amazon, 508 F.3d 1146  
12  Although, were I reforming what I’ll call “true” fair use, I would make authorship 
attribution a factor in assessing---if not a prerequisite to---fair use.  Cf. Berne Convention 
for the protection of literary and artistic works, arts. 10 and 10bis (requiring authorship 
attribution for quotation and similar exceptions) 
13 But cf. Hon. J. Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair 
Use? The 1999 Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 46 J. Copyright  Soc’y 512 (1999) 
(urging that the derivative works right be replaced by compulsory licensing). 
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readers in receiving works of authorship14 and of new distributors in 
purveying them. 
 “Permitted but Paid” uses may be divided into two classes: 
Subsidy (socially worthy redistributions); and Market Failure (transactions 
costs are too high to warrant a licensing solution; or a new mode of 
dissemination – infant industry – is threatened by copyright owner 
recalcitrance).  Because the latter class turns largely on facts which may 
evolve (the industry may grow up; licensing mechanisms may evolve), 
these uses’ classification as “Permitted but Paid” should be subject to a 
phase-out,15 for example, a renewable sunset following a five-year review 
by the Copyright Office.  
 I recognize that my categories present a variety of line-drawing 
challenges.  First, some would dispute my initial distinction between new 
authorship (true) fair use, and Subsidy or Market Failure “fair” use.16  That 
dispute probably derives from different normative visions of the value of 
creating new expression as opposed to receiving or reiterating extant 
expression.  As a result, I note the disagreement, but move on.  Second, 
the Subsidy and Market Failure categories may overlap as transaction 
costs may also characterize some of the kinds of uses I have characterized 
as subsidies, and social benefit may buttress the appeal of the transactions 
cost justification for a permitted use.  Nonetheless, I believe the categories 
are distinct, because there may be social policy reasons to continue to 
subsidize a use even if the transactions cost problem could be overcome.  
Finally, there is another boundary issue: Permitted-but-paid must be 
cabined so that it avoids the slippery slide into two opposite extremes.  On 
the one hand, my proposal should not lead to turning all of copyright law 
                                                     
14 See, e.g,, Jessica Litman, Readers’ Copyright, 58 J. Copyright Soc’y 325 (2011); 
Wendy Gordon, Fair Use Markets: On Weighing Potential License Fees, 79 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 1814 (2011). 
15 Thanks to Lital Helman for inspiring this solution.  Sunset provisions are not unknown 
in U.S. Copyright law, see. e.g., See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 119, 601. 
One might envision a third class of “fair use for others”: copying, (possibly 
intermediate copying) to enable others to engage in creative uses of others’ works.  But 
the claims of for-profit fair use enablers may often fall in the class of market failure 
permitted-but-paid uses, particularly if the enablers are compiling large databases of 
copyrighted works in order to facilitate, for example, data mining.  As a general 
proposition, courts have not embraced profit-making “fair use for others.”  See, e.g., 
Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); Basic 
Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1547 (rejecting fair use 
defense for for-profit maker of university coursepacks). 
16 See, e.g, Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free 
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L.J. 535 (2004); Wendy Gordon, Fair Use 
as Market Failure, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1982).  
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into a “liability rule”; on the other, it should not promote the conclusion 
that any use that can be paid for should be compensated (if not controlled). 
 The study proceeds as follows.  I first examine the evolution of the 
two classes of new distribution fair use cases.  As examples of social 
subsidies, I consider the treatment of educational copying from the 
legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act through Cambridge 
University Press v Becker (the Georgia State online “reserves” 
controversy),17 and then turn to library copying and the Hathi Trust case.  
Market failure cases encompass a range of examples of mass use of 
copyright works, from private copying to mass digitization (e.g. Google 
Books), to search engines. 
 The next part of this study looks to Europe, Australia, New 
Zealand and Canada.  These copyright regimes have typically provided 
compensation schemes for many of the non-creative uses surveyed here.  
The United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand have also established or 
are considering instituting “license it or lose it” systems to promote 
socially beneficial redistributions of copyrighted works.  Some European 
countries have, moreover, addressed market failure problems through 
“extended collective licensing” systems that merge features of statutory 
licenses and private ordering. 
 Finally, I consider how to implement “Permitted but Paid” in the 
U.S.  As an  initial matter, I inquire whether, subsequent to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in eBay v. MercExchange,18 the tightened conditions for 
issuing preliminary and permanent injunctions are resulting in a de facto 
Permitted but Paid regime.    If the usual panoply of copyright remedies 
nonetheless largely remains available, can the shadow of injunctive relief 
stimulate private ordering?  Can judges provide the impetus to private 
ordering by making fair use the backstop to a “license it or lose it” 
regime?  Or is legislation needed to enable private ordering, for example, 
by lessening antitrust constraints?  If legislation is a necessary adjunct to 
private ordering, who will set the backdrop royalty rates, and how will the 
                                                     
17 Another type of non-creative use of entire works (not analyzed here) is evidentiary use, 
for example submission of copies of third-party works in court proceedings, see, e.g., 
Scott v. WorldStarHipHop, Inc., 2011 WL 5082410 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2011); Shell v. 
City of Radford, Virginia, 351 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513 (W.D. Va. 2005), or as evidence of 
prior art in patent applications, see, AIP v Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner 
(Magistrate, D. Minn 2013).  NOTE TO BTLJ EDITORS: An 11th Cir decision in the 
Georgia State case is pending, and may require revising the relevant parts of this 
article. 
18 547 U.S. 388 (2006) 
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rates be determined?  I suggest that the Copyright Royalty Board might 
assume that task of rate-setting if the parties cannot agree, but that it 
should apply the method of last best offer arbitration (“baseball 
arbitration”) to arrive at the rate.  
 
I The evolution of redistribution fair use  
 U.S. copyright law has long recognized fair use as an exception 
favoring new creativity.19  Justice Story’s 1841 decision in Folsom v. 
Marsh,20 to which many assign the doctrine’s ancestor attribution,21 
refined the British rule of “fair abridgement”22 to emphasize the 
authorship contributions of the alleged infringer, as well as their impact on 
the market for the copied work.  Justice Story distinguished between “real, 
substantial condensation of the materials, and intellectual labor and 
judgment bestowed thereon” and “merely the facile use of the scissors; or 
extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original 
work.”23 The ensuing century and a half of fair use cases almost 
                                                     
19 The doctrinal roots of the fair use exception for new creativity can be traced back to the 
1841 Supreme Court opinion in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), 
discussed infra notes 20--23 and accompanying text. “New creativity fair use” cases still 
outnumber “redistribution fair use” cases on today’s dockets. For an illustrative but far 
from exhaustive list of modern “new creativity fair use” cases, see, for example, 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (deciding whether commercial 
parody of Roy Orbison’s song “Oh, Pretty Woman” by 2 Live Crew was fair use); Cariou 
v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (appropriation art); Bill Graham Archives v. 
Dorling Kindersley Limited, 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006) (reproduction of seven posters 
in biography of the band the Grateful Dead);  Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 
2006) (painting that adapted images from photograph); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures 
Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (parody of Vanity Fair cover photograph) . 
20 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).   
21 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575.  See generally, R. Anthony Reese, The Story of 
Folsom v. Marsh: Distinguishing Between Infringing and Legitimate Uses, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES, at 259 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. 
Ginsburg, eds. 2005). 
22 Epitomized in decisions such as Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 2 Atk. 141 (1740) 
and Sayre v Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 139 n.(b), 1 East 361 n.(b) (1785).  On the role of “fair 
abridgement” in promoting new creativity, see, e.g., Isabella Alexander, Copyright and 
the Public Interest in the Nineteenth Century 170—72 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010).  
On fair abridgement as a precursor to fair use, see, e.g., Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of 
Fair Use, 76 Brook. L. Rev. 1371 (2011)  
23 9 F.Cas. at 345.  Although in that case Judge Story found the use of the work (George 
Washington’s letters) to be infringing, notably because the letters constituted over 1/3 of 
defendant’s work and “impart[ed] to it . . . its essential value,” id at 349, he nonetheless 
praised the defendant’s objective of producing works for school libraries, and expressed 
the hope that the parties might come to an “amicable settlement,” id.  Folsom v. Marsh 
might thus be seen as a precursor to the social subsidy variant of Permitted but Paid; 
thanks for this point to Eva Subotnick. 
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exclusively debated the nature of the second author’s additions or 
alterations, pitted against the first author or copyright owner’s prospects 
for exploiting the work.24   The caselaw thus calibrated the basic moving 
parts of the traditional fair use doctrine: authorship, public benefit, 
economic impact.  The progress of learning25 advances when the law 
allows follow-on authors to bestow their intellectual labor and judgment in 
reworking selections from a prior work, without prejudicing the profits or 
prospects of that work. 
 Redistribution “fair uses” are different.  They do not directly 
produce new works.  (I recognize that consumption-directed uses may 
enrich the end user’s knowledge and reflections in ways that ultimately 
inform some subsequent creative endeavor,26 but the same might be said 
of everything, from works of authorship to cups of coffee, that becomes an 
“input” in a prospective author’s creative process.)  What motivations 
therefore underlie non authorship-based exceptions?  The caselaw and 
legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act indicate two broad 
impetuses.  First, the category I have, perhaps provocatively, called 
“subsidy,”27 in which redistributive copying for non-commercial purposes 
(generally by educational institutions or libraries) receives a free pass 
(subject to a variety of limitations).  (I recognize that those who reject the 
characterization of copyright as a “property right” will similarly contest 
the proposition that fair use effectively requires authors to underwrite free 
uses in the public interest.)  Second, and primarily in the case of 
redistributive uses developed by new (generally commercial) market 
entrants, “market failure” may justify both those uses that are as a 
practical matter insusceptible to licensing, notably because of their 
volume, and (more controversially) those whose licensing may be possible 
                                                     
24 See, e.g., cases cited supra, note 19. See also Columbia Broadcasting Inc. v. Loew’s, 
Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958); Benny v. Loew’s Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956); Shapiro, 
Bernstein & Co. v. P.F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). For an 
analysis of courts’ application of fair use under the 1909 Copyright Act, see Alan 
Latman, Study No. 14: Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, in II Studies on Copyright: 
Arthur Fisher Memorial Edition 781, 783—93 (Copyright Soc’y of U.S.A. eds,).  
25 See U.S. Const., Art. I. sec. 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have power . . . to promote the 
progress of science . . .); Rosemont Ents. v. Random House 366 F.2d 303, 307—311 
(1966) (applying fair use when enforcement of copyright, by rightowner who sought to 
suppress information, would frustrate the progress of science). 
26 Thanks to Wendy Gordon for this observation. 
27 But not as provocatively as, for example, Rob Merges, who has suggested that fair use 
across the board obliges authors to subsidize user-beneficiaries.  See Robert Merges, The 
End of Friction? Property Rights In The "Newtonian" World Of Online Commerce, 12 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 115, 115--16 (1997). 
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but whose licensors are unreasonably intractable.28  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, courts do not generally announce the latter basis, since it both 
implies second-guessing of business decisions and ascribes sinister 
motivations to the refusal to license.  As a result, those who invoke this 
justification do not often succeed.29  Nonetheless, I believe it underlies 
some fair use decisions, notably the Ninth Circuit’s recent holding in 
DISH Networks,30 whose fair use analysis (like the cursory and result-
oriented fair use analysis in the Supreme Court's Sony decision31 on which 
it relies) is otherwise unconvincing, at best. 
  The following discussion considers some examples of the two 
kinds of redistributive “fair uses.” 
A. Social subsidy fair use 
1. Non profit educational uses 
a. photocopying and the 1976 Act  
Section 107(1) identifies "nonprofit educational purposes" as a use 
whose “nature and purpose” favor a finding of fair use.32  The preamble to 
section 107 lists among the uses which in general exemplify fair use (but 
which courts must in each case examine) “teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use).” 33  Thus, as the Supreme Court has recognized, 
                                                     
28 A great deal has been written on “market failure” fair use since Wendy Gordon’s 
seminal 1982 article in the Columbia Law Review. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Urban, How 
Fair Use Can Solve the Orphan Works Problem, 27 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1379 (2012); 
Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 797 (2010); Alan L. Durham, 
Consumer Modification of Copyrighted Works, 81 Ind. L.J. 851 (2006); David M. 
Driesen & Shubha Ghosh , The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction 
Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 61 (2005); Maureen A. 
O’Rourke, Towards a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1177 
(2000); Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights 
Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 557 (1998); Julie E. 
Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of Rights Management, 
97 Mich. L. Rev. 462 (1998); Robert Merges, The End of Friction, supra; Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283 (1996). 
29 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting 
defendant’s contention that MP3 storage product was fair use because plaintiff failed to 
show that licensing in this area was not “‘traditional, reasonable, or likely to be 
developed’” (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 
1994)). Cf. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930--31 (rejecting market failure argument on grounds 
that market failure no longer existed due to emerging licensing market). 
30 Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013). 
31 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 




the 1976 Act specifies one form of use that does not involve new 
creativity,34 though the contours of this redistributive use remain 
undefined, and the inclusion of a use in the preamble does not confer a 
presumption of “fair-ness”.  Educational photocopying was in fact one of 
the most contested issues during the legislative process leading up to the 
1976 Act.35  The “Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in 
Not-for-Profit Educational Institutions With Respect to Books and 
Periodicals”36 that emerged from this process offers some indication of 
Congress’ intention regarding the scope of fair use.   
I do not wish to overemphasize the inferences to draw from the 
Guidelines, in part because they are highly contested,37 and because by 
their own terms, they identify a minimum threshold, in effect a safe 
harbor, thus leaving open the possibility of more extensive permissible 
free use.38  But several features of the Guidelines suggest that they focus 
on the acts of individual teachers.  For example, in addition to a “brevity” 
component, the Guidelines specify “spontaneity” (“the inspiration and 
decision to use the work and the moment of its use for maximum teaching 
effectiveness are so close in time that it would be unreasonable to expect a 
timely reply to a request for permission”); they limit multiple copying to 
no more than nine instances during a term, and perhaps most significantly, 
with respect to the intended beneficiary, “the copying of the material is for 
only one course in the school in which the copies are made.”  One may 
therefore query whether systematic copying, particularly of substantial 
                                                     
34 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579, n.11. (“The obvious statutory exception 
to this focus on transformative uses is the straight reproduction of multiple copies for 
classroom distribution.”) 
35 See, e.g., Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 
Cornell L. Rev.  857, 865-67 (1987).   
36 H.R. Rep. No. 1476 at 68-71, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 
37 Compare, Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 
1390-91 (6th Cir. 1996) (Guidelines provide useful guidance), with Cambridge U. Press 
v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1227-29 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (criticizing Guidelines’ 
legitimacy). For academic commentary critical of the Guidelines, see, e.g., Jennifer 
Rothman, Reconsidering Best Practices In the Context of Fair Use and Copyright Law, 
57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 371 (2010); Litman, supra note 11; Kenneth D. Crews, The Law 
of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair Use Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (2001); Gregory 
K. Klingsporn, CONFU And the Future of Fair Use Guidelines,  23 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 
101 (1999); Carol Silberberg, Note, Preserving Educational Fair Use in the Twenty-First 
Century 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (2001) 
38 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 68 ("[T]he following statement of guidelines is not intended 
to limit the types of copying permitted under the standards of fair use under judicial 
decision and which are stated in Section 107 of the Copyright Revision Bill. There may 
be instances in which copying which does not fall within the guidelines stated below may 
nonetheless be permitted under the criteria of fair use.") 
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course materials,39 by the educational institution, falls so far outside the 
Guidelines’ ambit as to exceed even the Guidelines’ undefined additional 
breathing space.  
 By the same token, the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
casts doubt on the application of fair use to institutional educational 
copying.  The Committee surmised: “The fair use doctrine in the case of 
classroom copying would apply primarily to the situation of a teacher 
who, acting individually and at his own volition, makes one or more 
copies for temporary use by himself or his pupils in the classroom. A 
different result is indicated where the copying was done by the educational 
institution, school system, or larger unit or where copying was required or 
suggested by the school administration, either in special instances or as 
part of a general plan.”40 
Educational institutions, however, have not been the defendants in 
most of the cases involving educational copying.  Although publishers 
sued New York University in the early 1980s over its systematic 
preparation of coursepacks, the case settled.41  The other photocopying 
decisions involved commercial actors,42 thus considerably attenuating the 
“public benefit” conferred by the unauthorized preparation of coursepacks.  
A decision rendered shortly after the enactment of the 1976 Act, 
Encyclopedia Britannica v Crooks,43 however, did involve educational 
copying (videotaping, not photocopying) by institutional defendants, but 
the facts of the case did not favor the application of fair use to 
institutional-level non-profit educational copying.  There, the producers of 
educational videos charged that defendant school districts comprising over 
100 schools videotaped television broadcasts of their works, built a library 
of these videotaped works, and made copies of these tapes for classroom 
use.  Because educational institutions constituted the principal market for 
the plaintiffs’ works, the school districts’ systematic copying substituted 
                                                     
39 The Guidelines also state: “Copying shall not be used to create or to replace or 
substitute for anthologies, compilations or collective works.” 
40 S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 63 (1976). 
41 The case, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. New York University, settled “on terms 
which included the incorporation of the Classroom Guidelines into the University’s 
official photocopying policies.” Bernard Zidar, Comment, Fair Use and the Code of the 
Schoolyard: Can Copyshops Compile Coursepacks Consistent with Copyright?, 46 
Emory L.J. 1363, 1377 (1997) (outlining history of Addison and other early 
photocopying cases). 
42 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1389 (6th Cir. 
1996); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d. 913, 922 (2d. Cir. 1994); Basic 
Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F.Supp. 1522, 1532 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
43 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). 
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for purchases of the programs.  The economic impact exceeded reasonable 
fair use tolerance even for publicly beneficial goals.   
More recently, however, a district court has found fair use in a case 
involving institutional-level creation of “electronic reserves,” arguably the 
digital era equivalent of photocopied coursepacks.   
b. Digital Copying  
 In Cambridge University Press v Becker,44 three academic 
publishers contended that Georgia State University systematically 
infringed their copyrights by adopting a policy that permitted faculty 
members to make excerpts from the plaintiffs’ works as electronic course 
reserves through the university library’s website.  The university’s 2009 
Copyright Policy allegedly “led to continuing abuse of the fair use 
privilege” by  “mak[ing] professors responsible for determining whether a 
particular use is a fair use” and requiring the professor to complete a “fair 
use checklist” to do so.   The plaintiffs identified 75 instances of 
alleged infringement during the three full semesters after the Copyright 
Policy was adopted. Faculty members had assigned the excerpts at issue as 
supplemental (but often required) reading in graduate or upper-level 
undergraduate courses in language or social science. The books from 
which the excerpts came were generally not textbooks, but rather single-
author monographs or edited collections of multiple chapters by a variety 
of authors. The “great majority” of the excerpts at issue constituted “a 
chapter or less from a multi-chapter book.” The average copied excerpt 
constituted about 10% of the book from which it was copied “(though 
some were considerably more and some were considerably less)”.  
Excerpts placed on electronic reserve were available by password only to 
students enrolled in the course, and only during the semester in which the 
student was enrolled, but students could create permanent retention copies 
by downloading or printing the reserve readings for their courses.  
 Following a bench trial, the court found most of the copying to be 
fair use.  Evaluating “the purpose and the character of the use,” the court 
                                                     
44 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1201 (N.D. Ga. 2012).  While I have classified coursepacks and 
electronic reserves as forms of reiterative copying, one might contend that the selection 
of excerpts to copy results in a kind of anthology, which might be considered not merely 
a new use but a new work.  That there may be some authorship component to the 
selection of materials to copy does not compel such a recharacterization.  The Georgia 
State court did not consider the copying at issue to be “transformative”. Id. at 1232 
(“Taking into account the fact that this case involves only mirror-image, 
nontransformative uses . . .”).  
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concluded that the first factor favored fair use, because the copying 
fulfilled the section 107 preamble-listed purposes of teaching students and 
for scholarship and was performed by a nonprofit educational institution 
“for strictly nonprofit educational purposes.” The court distinguished the 
photocopy cases, whose defendants were for-profit entities. Pointing to the 
statute’s explicit inclusion of classroom copies, the court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ argument that the non-creative nature of the copying weighed 
against fair use.  Applying the second factor, the court deemed the works 
primarily informational, hence more subject to fair use.  The final two 
factors furnished the most significant, and debatable, aspects of the court’s 
analysis.  
 With respect to the third factor, the “amount and substantiality of 
the portion used, in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” the court 
attributed little significance to the Classroom Guidelines.  Since the 
Guidelines’ safe harbor set the minimum standards of educational fair use, 
not the maximum, the court concluded that the outcome of this factor’s 
analysis did not turn on meeting the Guidelines requirements.  Turning 
instead to the text of the third factor, the court addressed the question of 
what constituted “the copyrighted work as a whole,” in relation to which 
the amount and substantiality of the defendant’s copying should be 
evaluated. Although the publishers urged that each chapter of their 
copyrighted books should be seen as a separate work, so that copying an 
entire chapter would constitute copying the entire work, the court ruled 
that the argument was not timely raised.  Moreover, conflating copyright 
ownership with the identification of the “work,” the court indicated that 
since the publishers had obtained copyright assignments from the authors 
of the separate contributions to edited volumes, those contributions should 
not be assessed separately for purposes of fair use analysis, lest the 
publishers “choke out nonprofit educational use of the chapter as a fair 
use.”  The court “w[ould] not allow this to happen,”45 and therefore 
analyzed the substantiality of the copying with respect to the book as a 
whole.46   
 Of course, an amount quantitatively insubstantial with respect to 
the book as a whole could be qualitatively substantial, and therefore weigh 
against fair use, but the court determined that because the books were 
divided into distinct topics, the copied excerpts lacked “a dominant 
                                                     
45 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1234. 
46 By contrast, in Texaco, the court addressed not only the journal issue as a whole, but 




relationship to the substance of the work as a whole.”47  It is not clear what 
this standard means, but it appears to make qualitative insubstantiality an 
inevitable consequence of addressing more than one topic per book.  
Moreover,  
it is relevant that selection of a whole chapter of a book (either from 
a typical, single author chapter book or from an edited book) likely 
will serve a more valuable educational purpose than an excerpt 
containing a few isolated paragraphs. Professors want students to 
absorb ideas and useful, context-based information. This can be 
accomplished better through chapter assignments than through 
truncated paragraphs. However, the selected excerpt must fill a 
demonstrated, legitimate purpose in the course curriculum and must 
be narrowly tailored to accomplish that purpose.48 
 
Thus, more copying is called for rather than less, especially since a court 
is unlikely to second-guess the instructor’s determination – by virtue of 
assigning the excerpt – that the excerpt “fills a legitimate purpose in the 
course curriculum . . .”   The same consideration that the publishers 
signaled as evidence of the qualitative substantiality of the excerpt instead 
bolsters the defense that the institution took no more than appropriate to 
the pedagogical task. 
 In any event, the court’s treatment of the fourth factor, the effect 
on the potential market for or value of the work, arguably rendered 
irrelevant its analysis of the amount and substantiality of the copying, 
apart from its determination that the copyrighted “works” at issue were the 
whole books in which the copied excerpts appeared. The court viewed the 
danger of market substitution as the principal concern under this factor, 
and set the substitution threshold at 10% of the book as a whole.  The 
court in effect created a bright-line presumption in favor of fair use if the 
defendant copied no more than 10% of the pages of a book containing 
fewer than ten chapters, or up to but not more than one chapter of a book 
with ten or more chapters.   
Whatever the merits of the 10% free pass, the court’s treatment of 
excerpts in excess of 10% suggests a useful approach of broader potential 
application, as we will see in subsequent sections of this article.  The court 
acknowledged the significance of the market for licensing excerpts (even 
if the full book supplies the reference point for the quantum of copying), 
and the deleterious impact on the value of the work were licensing fees to 
                                                     
47 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1233. 
48 Id.  
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go unpaid. But the court concluded that “[f]or loss of potential license 
revenue to cut against fair use, the evidence must show that licenses for 
excerpts of the works at issue are easily accessible, reasonably priced, and 
that they offered excerpts in a format which is reasonably convenient for 
users.”49  For many of the works at issue, the court concluded that the 
record did not establish that licenses for digital copies of the works were 
available in 2009 when the defendants put the excerpts at issue on 
electronic reserve. Where “digital permissions were not shown to be 
available,” the court ruled that the defendants’ use “caused no actual or 
potential damage to the value of the books’ copyrights.”50 Where digital 
permissions were available, by contrast, the court ruled that the fourth 
factor would weigh heavily against fair use.51 In other words, the court 
instituted a “license it, or lose it” system.  Or, more accurately, the court 
gave ten percent off the top to the educational institution (this is the social 
welfare subsidy) and then imposed a solution akin to a compulsory 
license.  Except that where compulsory licenses in copyright have 
traditionally been creatures of legislation, with government-set rates, here 
the court in effect compelled the copyright owners to license, lest the use 
be allowed for free, but left the rate-setting to the parties, subject, perhaps, 
to judicial verification that the licenses “are easily accessible [and] 
reasonably priced.”  We will return to “license it, or lose it” when we 
address copyright exceptions for redistributive uses in other countries, and 
in our proposals for U.S. copyright reform.  
2. Library uses  
Library uses present another instance of social subsidy fair use.  
Unlike educational photocopying (whose partial “Guidelines” appear in an 
appendix to the report of the House Judiciary Committee), specified types 
of library copying received explicit statutory coverage in section 108 of 
the 1976 Act.  Section 108, however, was drafted with such specificity 
that, despite some updating in 1998, it has failed to keep pace with digital 
technologies.52  Section 108 nonetheless points to further flexibility by 
                                                     
49 Id. at 1237. 
50 Id. at 1238. 
51 The court accordingly found five instances of use it deemed not “fair.”  See also 
Cambridge University Press v. Becker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123154 (N.D. Ga. August 
10, 2012) (relief for five instances of copyright infringement). 
52 See, e.g., Library of Congress, The Section 108 Study Group Report, March 2008, at i 
(“Due to the rapid pace of technological and social change, the law embodies some now-




cautioning that “Nothing in this section . . . in any way affects the rights of 
fair use as provided by section 107 . . .”53    
Authors Guild v. Hathi Trust,54 tested the relationship between the 
two provisions.  The district court announced a broad fair use privilege to 
create and store digital copies of entire books for purposes of enabling 
access to the contents of books by the visually impaired, and to enable 
“data mining” of full text.  The district court rejected the authors’ 
contention that the constraints contained within section 108, notably 
disallowing “systematic” reproductions, limited the scope of fair use.  
Although the Hathi Trust libraries were engaged in further copying of the 
full scans of their collections (digitized by Google) the court observed that 
“the wholesale copying of works” could be permissible “where the use 
and purpose for the copies was clearly distinguishable from those of the 
original.”55  The data mining uses did not generate any output of 
copyrightable expression; the print-disabled formed an audience distinct 
from the readers to whom the copyright owners marketed the books: 
“[P]rovision of access for them was not the intended use of the original 
work (enjoyment and use by sighted persons) and this use is 
transformative.”56  (The latter rationale comes perilously close to 
suggesting that anytime a third party develops a new audience for the 
work, distribution of the work to that audience is “transformative.”) 
The first factor finding of “transformative use” influenced the 
court’s analysis of the fourth factor, for a “transformative use” fills a 
“transformative market,” which, at least for non-commercial uses, is 
presumed not to substitute for the work’s usual markets.57  The court gave 
short shrift to the authors’ contended economic harm from lost licensing 
opportunities.  First, and perhaps circularly, if the market is 
“transformative,” there is no cognizable harm because impairment to a 
transformative, as opposed to a traditional, market doesn’t count.  Second, 
the costs of creating a licensing market are too great to permit developing 
such a market.  Third, there is no evidence that a collective licensing 
                                                     
53 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4). 
54 902 F.Supp.2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
55 Id. at 460. 
56 Id at 461. 
57  As many commentators have recognized, the first and fourth factors have long 
dominated judicial application of section 107.  Already the essential factor one inquiry, 
“transformative use” now seems to become transformed (distorted) into a determinative 
factor four assessment as well.  Perhaps, to use Barton Beebe’s term, a factor one finding 
of “transformative use” now results in “stampeding” all the other factors, including, and 
especially, the fourth. 
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solution (which would reduce the cost of implementing a licensing 
program) is in fact in prospect.   
A perceived social imperative may well underlie the court’s rather 
cavalier treatment of the potential licensing market.  Concluding its fair 
use analysis, the court declared, “I cannot imagine a definition of fair use 
that would not encompass the transformative uses made by Defendants’ 
M[ass] D[igitization] P[roject] and would require that I terminate this 
invaluable contribution to the progress of science and cultivation of the 
arts that at the same time effectuates the ideals espoused by the 
A[mericans with] D[isabilities] A[ct].”58  Note the court’s assumption that 
were the fair use defense to fail, the libraries’ socially beneficial initiatives 
would have to be “terminated.”  If the choice is all-or-nothing, a fair use 
outcome is assured.  But, as the Georgia State ruling suggests, the Hathi 
Trust court may have embraced a false dichotomy.  Admittedly, in 
Georgia State, a licensing mechanism, through the Copyright Clearance 
Center, already existed, but it was not adequate to the task at the time the 
electronic reserves program began.  The Georgia federal court’s ruling 
surely will provide the impetus to improve the licensing program so that it 
does respond to the demand.   Hathi Trust does not even give licensing a 
chance.  One might rejoin that there is no need to license if the use is 
fair.59  But if the use is fair because it supposedly can’t reasonably be 
licensed, then nipping licensing in the bud deprives the author of 
compensation and gives the user an unwarranted free pass.60  This brings 
us to the second class of redistributive uses, characterized not by social 
benefit, but by “market failure”. 
B. Market failure/new market fair use  
 “Market failure” may mean many things to many courts and 
commentators.  I am here using it in the sense proposed by Wendy Gordon 
as “market malfunction” rather than what she calls “inherent limitation,” 
which I understand to import a normative gloss: a market could function, 
                                                     
58 Id. at 465. 
59 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 14, at 1824-25; Mark Lemley, Should a Licensing Market 
Require Licensing?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (2007); Matthew Africa, The 
Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, New Markets, 
and the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1148-49 (2000). This objection, however, 
primarily arises in the context of new works rather than new distributions. 
60 There may, however, be other justifications, such as solicitude for the visually-
impaired, for allowing the use for free. 
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but policy reasons make such markets undesirable.61  Large-scale non-
creative uses, particularly in the digital environment, may make the cost of 
seeking and paying for authorization prohibitive for the user, while 
yielding little advantage for the copyright owner.  The public interest (here 
equated, perhaps abusively, with that of the user) in the new form of 
distribution thus would be frustrated, with insufficient countervailing 
benefit to creators (were there such a benefit, it would serve the long-term 
interest of the public in ensuring that we “have a supply of good books”62).  
If “market failure” primarily concerns practical inability to develop a 
paying market, a variant on the theme of “market malfunction” is 
unwillingness to develop the market.  While the exclusive rights copyright 
vests in authors normally entitle them to decide whether and how to 
exploit their works, courts have on occasion rejected infringement claims 
in order to allow the new market to emerge,63 or in order to counter 
perceived copyright owner abuse.64  (The two variants, moreover, are not 
                                                     
61
 See Wendy Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction 
Costs Have Always Been Only Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 149, 151-53 
(2003).  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569 (1993), is a good example of an “inherent 
limitation”: when the Court announced there was “the law recognizes no derivative 
market for critical works, including parody,” id. at 592,  it was making a normative, not 
an empirical, declaration. 
62 Macaulay, A Speech delivered in the House of Commons on the 5th of February, 1841, 
Parliamentary Debates on the Copyright Bill, Hansard, 3rd Ser., 56 (1841): 341-60 (5 
Feb.), available at Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), 
http://copy.law.cam.ac.uk/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=record_uk_1841c.  
Many commentators cite Macaulay’s characterization of copyright as an “exceedingly 
bad” “tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers,” without 
acknowledging that in the same speech, Macaulay also said: “The advantages arising 
from a system of copyright are obvious. It is desirable that we should have a supply of 
good books: we cannot have such a supply unless men of letters are liberally 
remunerated; and the least objectionable way of remunerating them is by means of 
copyright. You cannot depend for literary instruction and amusement on the leisure of 
men occupied in the pursuits of active life. Such men may occasionally produce 
compositions of great merit. But you must not look to such men for works which require 
deep meditation and long research. Works of that kind you can expect only from persons 
who make literature the business of their lives.  . . .  Such men must be remunerated for 
their literary labour. And there are only two ways in which they can be remunerated. One 
of those ways is patronage [which Macaulay excoriated]; the other is copyright.” 
63 Kelly, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
64 “Copyright trolling” occurs when the owners of copyrights (not the original authors of 
the copyrighted works) bring infringement claims with the sole goal of profiting through 
litigation, usually by forcing quick settlements. A notable example of a “troll” is 
Righthaven, LLC, which has brought numerous infringement claims in recent years. See, 
e.g., Righthaven, LLC v. Va. Citizens Def. League, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-01683-GMN, 
2011 WL 2550627 (D. Nev. June 23, 2011) (suing nonprofit group for posting article on 
website); Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1151 (D. Nev. 2011), aff'd 
in part, vacated in part, 716 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2013) (suing individual posting 
copyrighted work in online forum); Righthaven, LCC v. Jama, No. 2:10–CV–1322 JCM 
(LRL) (D. Nev. Apr. 22, 2011) (suing nonprofit group as in Va. Citizens Def. League, 
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mutually exclusive, with the latter sometimes reinforcing the former.65)  
The examples I will consider are private copying and mass digitization.  
Mass digitization in turn covers “orphan works,” databases of copyrighted 
works, of which Google’s book-scanning program is the leading instance, 
and image search engines.   
1. Private copying  
As end-users already, and will increasingly, enjoy copyrighted 
works of all kinds through licensed access-based models,66 the market 
failure problem of private copying may appear vestigial.  “On demand” 
transmissions may replace both retention and “time-shifting” copies, for 
there is no need to “time-shift” when one can receive the work at any time, 
and no need to possess a copy if the content is accessible at will.  U.S. 
caselaw does not in any event support a general private copying fair use 
exception for retention copies67; an exception does in effect exist for 
analog copies of musical recordings,68 and another is in place for backup 
copies of computer programs,69 but they are the fruits of specific 
legislation, not fair use litigation. The Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios
70 did, however, rule (on a rather 
cursory, and now partly-abandoned, analysis71) that time-shifting of free 
broadcast television was a fair use.  I will not here rehearse the reasoning 
and critiques of Sony other than to observe that the 5-justice majority may 
have perceived an all-or-nothing choice: extending fair use to copying 
                                                                                                                                                              
with court noting that use of copyright by plaintiffs “has been shown to be nothing more 
than litigation-driven”).  See also Brad Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively 
Fair Uses, 85 U. Colo. L. Rev. 53, 111-14 (2014) (suggesting bad faith should lead to a 
presumption of fair use). 
65 According to a leading account of the business backstory to the Sony “Betamax case,” 
the studios were endeavoring to shut down the video tape recorder in favor of the 
playback-only Video disk technology that the studios had licensed.  See James Lardner, 
Fast Forward: Hollywood, The Japanese, and the Onslaught of the VCR 28—36 (1987).  
66 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The 
Development of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 113 
(2003). 
67 See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d. 349 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (rejecting fair use defense for company engaged in creating digital backup copies 
of subscribers’ CDs).  
68 See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (no infringement action “based on the noncommercial use by a 
consumer of [an analog recording device] for making . . . analog musical recordings.”) 
69 Id. § 117(a). 
70 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  
71 See, e.g., Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect 
Copyright Liability's Continuing Tort Framework and Sony's De Facto Demise, 55 
UCLA L. Rev. . 143 (2007); Jessica Litman, Mary Poppins Meets the Boston Strangler: 
The Story of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, in Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, 
supra note 16, at 358.  
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entire works for the same purpose for which they were disseminated was a 
significant departure from prior law (as the Ninth Circuit had emphasized 
below72), but limiting fair use to what was then called “productive” use of 
limited portions of prior works, could have meant depriving the American 
public of a widely-available and extremely popular device whose use, five 
Justices concluded, was not harming the copyright owners’ television 
broadcast market.73  (As the dissent stressed, the majority gave scant 
consideration to the new markets that time-shifting would spawn74.) 
  Given Sony’s failure to blossom into a general fair use private 
copying privilege,75 and the court’s subsequent retreat from its emphasis 
on the significance of commercial use, one may wonder whether Sony 
retains relevance.  Indeed, some have suggested that if the Court had it to 
do over again today, it might come out differently, notably because video 
recorders now offer playback without commercials.76  Another reason to 
query the continued persuasiveness of Sony’s factor four analysis (the only 
factor on which the court bestowed any sustained analysis) is the 
burgeoning conflict between time-shifting and video on demand.  Fox 
Broadcasting v DISH Network,77 illustrates the conflict, and demonstrates 
how a well-advised entrepreneur can structure its copyright-dependent 
technology in order to fit a new business model within fair use boundaries 
even in the absence of the usual normative or market failure justifications. 
Dish Network, a satellite TV transmission service which 
retransmits television programming under license, offers its customers the 
Hopper, a set-top box with both digital video recording and video-on-
demand capabilities. Dish’s “PrimeTime Anytime” (“PTAT”) feature 
                                                     
72 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 
464 U.S. 417 (“[T]he result of applying fair use to intrinsic use cases like Williams & 
Wilkins Co. and this case is a fundamental restructuring of the copyright system not 
justified by the statutory scheme or traditional notions of fair use.”).  
73 Accord, Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 Colum. J. L. & Arts 433, 439 (2008). 
74 Sony, 464 U.S. at 497-98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The Court has struggled 
mightily to show that VTR use has not reduced the value of the Studios' copyrighted 
works in their present markets. Even if true, that showing only begins the proper inquiry. 
The development of the VTR has created a new market for the works produced by the 
Studios.”). 
75 Or to impel legislation generally to authorize but provide compensation for private 
audio and video copying, apart from a very specific and largely obsolete law on digital 
audio tape recorders, see 17 U.S.C., chapter 10. 
76  See, e.g., Ned Snow, The TiVo Question: Does Skipping Commercials Violate 
Copyright Law?, 56 Syracuse L. Rev. 27 (2005); Randal C. Picker, The Digital Video 
Recorder: Unbundling Advertising and Content, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev.  205 (2004); Michael 
A. Einhorn, Internet Television and Copyright Licensing: Balancing Cents and 
Sensibility, 20 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.  (2002).  
77 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013).  
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allows subscribers to set a single timer on the Hopper to record and store 
on the Hopper all primetime programming on any of the four major 
broadcast networks each night of the week. Finally, Dish’s AutoHop 
feature enables users to skip commercials in PTAT recordings.  Fox 
charged Dish with direct and contributory infringement.  The Ninth 
Circuit rejected the claim of direct infringement, on the (dubious)78 ground 
that only the user “made” the PTAT copies.  Fox’s contributory liability 
claim turned on a finding of primary infringement by Dish’s customers.  
Applying Sony, the Ninth Circuit determined that Dish’s customers were 
engaging in non commercial fair use time-shifting.  The commercial-
skipping feature, the court ruled, did not affect the analysis of the 
economic impact of the copying, because the television producer was not 
the copyright owner of the commercials.  Losing the commercials may 
well have had a deleterious impact, but the harm did not derive from any 
act that infringed any copyright of Fox’s.  Similarly, while Fox licensed its 
programming to other on-demand services such as Hulu, with which 
Dish’s service competed, “the ease of skipping commercials, rather than 
the on-demand availability of Fox programs, causes any market harm. And 
as we have discussed, the commercial-skipping does not implicate any 
copyright interest.”79 
This astoundingly obtuse analysis recalls the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n,80 in which the panel 
majority (over Judge Kozinski’s trenchant dissent) granted the credit card 
payment provider’s motion to dismiss a contributory infringement claim 
on the ground that the commission of the infringement did not require 
processing the payment.  As a matter of technology, it is true that the 
copies could be made and distributed without the intervention of Visa. 
But, as Judge Kozinski stressed, the pirate enterprise whose transactions 
Visa processed wouldn’t be making and distributing infringing copies if it 
couldn’t be paid for it.81  In Dish Network, the question should not have 
been whether Fox had any copyright interest in the advertisements that the 
Dish customers copied but did not view (indeed, imagine a version of 
                                                     
78 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent Developments in US Copyright – Part II, Caselaw: 
Exclusive Rights on the Ebb, 218 Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur 167, 215--229 
October 2008) (criticizing Second Circuit’s analysis of who “makes” the copy). Cf. 
National Rugby League Investments Pty Limited v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd., [2012] 
FCAFC 59, (Federal Court, Australia) (rejecting Second Circuit’s analysis and finding 
provider of remote DVR service to have “made” the copy, perhaps in conjunction with 
the end-user). 
79 723 F.3d at 1076. 
80 494 F.3d 788 ( 9th Cir. 2007). 
81 494 F.3d at 818--19. 
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Auto-Hop which recognizes commercials and does not record them; then 
even if Fox had owned those copyrights, they would not have been 
infringed precisely because the customers did not copy them; nonetheless, 
the economic effect in all cases remains the same).  What allows free 
broadcast television (and Fox’s free licensing to Hulu and other internet 
services, provided they retain the ads) to be free are the advertisements; 
take these away and the business model becomes unsustainable.  The 
“value of the work” accordingly diminishes as a result of the third party 
copying and commercial-skipping. 
Thus, while licensed on-demand transmissions may in general be 
displacing private copying, entrepreneurs can in effect structure the 
enabling of end-user time-shifting to afford most of the convenience of 
video on demand (the selection of programming will not be infinite; it will 
be limited to whatever is broadcast over the four networks in the course of 
a week), without the pesky commercials (and, of course, without paying 
the copyright owners).  The operation is technically time-shifting; in 
“feel” to the consumer, however, it’s essentially video on demand, but 
better.  Not only does the time-shifting substitute for a licensed use (no 
“transformative purpose” here), but there is no inability to license on-
demand access.  If there is a justification for this outcome, it must be in 
the court’s perception that business models to facilitate time-shifting that 
free customers from commercials are desirable and should not be 
suppressed by copyright owners who will not license commercial-free 
retransmissions.  (Either that, or the following wooden syllogism: end-user 
non-commercial time-shifting via video tape recorder is fair use; the DVR 
and AutoHop offer time-shifting updated for the digital age; therefore their 
use is fair use too.) 
   2. Mass Digitization 
 Mass digitization does, at least at first blush, appear to present 
intractable transactions cost problems.  The number of works at issue, and 
the difficulty of locating their right holders, and even if located, obtaining 
the necessary rights, may make fair use seem a desirable solution, even for 
copying and communication of entire works.  The proposition does, 
however, produce an obvious anomaly: the fewer works one copies, the 
weaker the case for market failure fair use; but vast, immodest, copying 
entitles the copyist to persist, without permission and without paying.  
Closer examination, moreover, suggests that volume of copying, standing 
alone, does not suffice for a free pass, though difficulties in rightowner 
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location may justify a flexible solution.  In either event, if the use is to be 
permitted, in many instances it should also be paid. 
a. Orphan Works 
The problem of “orphan works” by now is well-known: Would-be 
users who are unable to locate the copyright owner, but whose use or 
exploitation would not qualify for a copyright limitation or exception 
(such as fair use), must decide whether to renounce their projects or to 
incur the risk that the copyright owner will reappear once the exploitation 
is underway, and will demand both injunctive and substantial monetary 
relief in an ensuing infringement action.  Potentially frustrated users range 
widely, from commercial entities who seek to reissue out-of-print works 
or to create new works based on “orphan” works, to cultural institutions, 
notably museums and libraries, who seek to digitize works for 
preservation and educational purposes,82 to individuals who seek to 
incorporate an “orphan” work in their webpage or blog.  The former US 
Register of Copyrights deemed the orphan works problem “pervasive.”83 
When the Copyright Office first embarked on solving the problem 
of orphan works, the premise of its inquiry in 2005 was that the use would 
involve more copying, particularly as a result of digital media, than fair 
                                                     
82 The European endeavors concerning orphan works have taken place primarily in the 
context of the Commission’s “i2010 initiative” on digital libraries.  See Communication 
“i2010: digital libraries” of 30 September 2005, COM(2005) 465 final; Commission 
Recommendation of 24 August 2006, on the digitisation and online accessibility of 
cultural material and digital preservation (2006/585/EC), OJEU L 236/28 (31.8.2006), 
Recital 10; Recommendation 6(a)(c), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/digital_libraries/doc/recommen
dation/recommendation_august06/en.pdf  
83 See Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcommittee on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary, United States 
House of Representatives, 110th Congress, 2nd Session, March 13, 2008, available at  
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031308.html: “In fact, the most striking aspect of 
orphan works is that the frustrations are pervasive in a way that many copyright problems 
are not. When a copyright owner cannot be identified or is unlocatable, potential users 
abandon important, productive projects, many of which would be beneficial to our 
national heritage. Scholars cannot use the important letters, images and manuscripts they 
search out in archives or private homes, other than in the limited manner permitted by fair 
use or the first sale doctrine. Publishers cannot recirculate works or publish obscure 
materials that have been all but lost to the world. Museums are stymied in their creation 
of exhibitions, books, websites and other educational programs, particularly when the 
project would include the use of multiple works. Archives cannot make rare footage 
available to wider audiences. Documentary filmmakers must exclude certain manuscripts, 
images, sound recordings and other important source material from their films.”  
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use could bear, for example republication of whole books.84 Analysis 
therefore turned to remedies: might these be structured in a way that 
encouraged the reuse of orphan works by lowering the (by definition, 
infringing) user’s risk of substantial monetary exposure.85  More recently, 
however, some commentators now argue that the difficulty of locating the 
rightowner should enter, and favor, the fair use calculus, so that the user 
owes no damages should the rightowner reappear.86  Orphan works 
regimes (we will consider the ones in effect in the EU and in Canada in 
Part II) do not spare their beneficiaries transactions costs.  They may in 
effect cap them, but by requiring that the would-be exploiter accomplish a 
“diligent search” for rightholders, orphan works regimes in fact mandate 
potentially significant expenditures in location costs.  As a result, an 
orphan works regime, whether based in unpaid fair use (which may raise 
issues of compliance with international standards for permissible 
exceptions87), or modifying remedies (essentially a form of permitted-but-
paid, at least for exploitations occurring before the copyright owner’s 
reappearance), or requiring payment to a fund on behalf of the missing 
rightowner (with escheat to local cultural initiatives should the rightowner 
not reappear after a certain time) is not an answer to the transactions cost 
problem of mass digitization.  Mass digitization involves wholesale 
copying; orphan works regimes operate at retail.  Whether for free, or 
permitted-but-paid, the justification for an orphan works exception lies in 
the public benefit of the reuse, particularly if the beneficiaries of the 
exception are non-profit educational and library institutions, rather than as 
a response to transaction costs. 
b. Databases of copyrighted works  
True mass digitization, by contrast, can confront the large-scale 
user with the typical transaction costs conundrum: even where a diligent 
(or even not-so-diligent) search could locate the rightowner, the cost of 
                                                     
84 Report of the Register of Copyrights, Report on Orphan Works (2006) (“For purposes 
of developing a legislative solution we have defined the ‘orphan works’ situation to be 
one where the use goes beyond any exemption or limitation to copyright, such as fair 
use.”). 
85 H.R. 5889, S. 2913, 110th Cong, 2d sess., introduced 24 April 2008. See, Jane C. 
Ginsburg, Recent Developments in US Copyright – Part I, Legislative Developments: 
Orphan Works, 217 Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur 99 (July 2008), available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/columbia/pllt/papers/08152] 
86 See, e.g., Jennifer Urban, How Fair Use Can Help Solve the Orphan Works Problem, 
27 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1379 (2012) (for libraries and archives). 
87 Berne 9(2), TRIPS 13; see Reply Comments of Profs. Jane C. Ginsburg and Paul 




clearing rights can exceed the benefit of being able to use the work. But 
these costs should not be overstated.  The problem is primarily 
transitional; for works currently in commerce or disseminated with some 
form of copyright management information, rightowners can be found and 
their terms and conditions known.  (Actually having to pay or reach some 
agreement with a known rightowner is not a “transactions cost” that 
should dispense a commercial actor-user from either.88)   
As to in-copyright, out-of-commerce works (some of which may 
be “orphans”), the recently–decided Google Book scanning controversy 
raises a variety of issues.  With the rejection of the class action settlement 
that would have allowed display of substantial portions of the books’ 
text,89 Google’s program and concomitant fair use defenses shrank to 
providing bibliographic information and displays of “snippets” (2-3 lines) 
of text in response to user search queries, as well as access to the database 
of scanned books for purposes of data mining.  Google still retains the 
scanned full text of millions of in-copyright books, but the “output” its 
users encounter either eschews copyrightable expression or consists of 
very short extracts.  Google had also sought to bolster its fair use argument 
by invoking a variant of the transactions costs problem.  In this instance 
“diligent search” costs were not involved: Google made no pretense of 
endeavoring to find right owners of out-of-commerce books.  Rather, it 
urged that the sheer number of rightholders implicated by the mass 
digitization made ex ante rights clearance unduly onerous.  Accordingly, 
Google contended that the burden should be on the right holders to object 
to Google’s use, not on Google to obtain their accord.  And in what some 
might consider adding insult to injury, Google contended that its program 
should be deemed a fair use because rightholders had the opportunity to 
“opt out”.   
Arguably, the “opt out” feature was a diversion (albeit a portentous 
one for the future conceptualization of copyright), and in any event seems 
to have dropped out of the litigation by the time Judge Chin issued his 
opinion on Nov.14, 2013.  The relevant question should have been 
whether to focus exclusively on the probably non-infringing outputs, or to 
concentrate on the creation and maintenance of a massive full-text 
commercial database.  The Southern District of New York’s Hathi Trust 
decision was an encouraging precedent for the former approach, though, 
                                                     
88 This proposition may need to be qualified with regard to non-commercial actors: the 
Georgia State case suggests that failure to provide a user-friendly license could make the 
copyright owner vulnerable to a successful fair use defense. 
89 See Authors Guild Inc. v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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unlike the library consortium, Google is not an eleemosynary institution, 
and it is not apparent that it requires a social subsidy of the sort that 
benefits non profit libraries.  Nonetheless, there is a powerful argument 
that exploiting a work for its non-expressive information (bibliographic or 
bean-counting – how many times and in what works a given word or 
phrase appears) should not even be prima-facie infringing, and the 
creation of a database that enables non-expressive, but progress-of-
knowledge-enhancing outputs must be equally free.  But this proves too 
much: under U.S. law, a library, including a commercial library, is fully 
entitled to lend the books it owns; the first sale doctrine precludes any 
copyright claim.  But the library is not entitled to acquire the lending 
copies without paying for them (or receiving them as a gift).  What Google 
does, or enables others to do, with the outputs may not be infringing, but 
those uses should not have obscured the inputs.90  
Judge Chin, however, focused almost exclusively on the outputs, in 
one sentence effectively bootstrapping the inputs: “as one of the keys to 
Google Books is its offering of full-text search of books, full-work 
reproduction is critical to the functioning of Google Books.”  That 
functioning, Judge Chin celebrated as “highly transformative,” thus 
following the now-rampant use of the term to bless   redistributive uses of 
entire works in the perceived public interest.  
The use of book text to facilitate search through the display 
of snippets is transformative.  . . .  Google Books thus uses 
words for a different purpose -- it uses snippets of text to 
act as pointers directing users to a broad selection of books.  
Similarly, Google Books is also transformative in the sense 
that it has transformed book text into data for purposes of 
substantive research, including data mining and text mining 
in new areas, thereby opening up new fields of research. 
Words in books are being used in a way they have not been 
used before. 
                                                     
90 Hathi Trust’s reliance on the “intermediate copying” ground for fair use is not fully 
persuasive, even for non commercial entities.  Three salient differences with intermediate 
copying fair use cases such as Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 915 F.2d 1510 
(9th Cir. 1992): the copies there were generated as a necessary part of the copyist’s 
creation of a new and independent work; the copyist did not retain the copy; and the 
information needed to create the new work could not be ascertained in other ways. 
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Google Books has created something new in the use of 
book text -- the frequency of words and trends in their 
usage provide substantive information.  
Google Books does not supersede or supplant books 
because it is not a tool to be used to read books. Instead, it 
"adds value to the original" and allows for "the creation of 
new information, new aesthetics, new insights and 
understandings." 
 On the question of the impact of Google’s copying on the potential 
market for plaintiffs’ books, Judge Chin, perhaps surprisingly, embraced 
the long-spurned argument that defendant’s coping does the plaintiff a 
favor by bringing the work to greater public attention.91  
A reasonable factfinder could only find that Google Books 
enhances the sales of books to the benefit of copyright 
holders. An important factor in the success of an individual 
title is whether it is discovered -- whether potential readers 
learn of its existence. Google Books provides a way for 
authors' works to become noticed, much like traditional in-
store book displays. Indeed, both librarians and their 
patrons use Google Books to identify books to purchase.  
Many authors have noted that online browsing in general 
and Google Books in particular helps readers find their 
work, thus increasing their audiences.  Further, Google 
provides convenient links to booksellers to make it easy for 
a reader to order a book. In this day and age of on-line 
shopping, there can be no doubt but that Google Books 
improves books sales.92 
Both Hathi Trust and Google Books adopt the premise that a 
rejection of the fair use defense will deprive the public of the benefits of 
the defendant’s program.  But, does it follow that if the inputs are 
infringing, the generation of non-infringing outputs must be “terminated” 
unless the inputs are licensed?  In a post-eBay93 remedial landscape, it is 
not at all clear that a court would award injunctive relief, particularly if it 
estimated the measure of damages as the price of one copy of each book 
                                                     
91 On courts’ previous failure to find this contention persuasive, see, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, 
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1990). 
92  Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
93 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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(for works unregistered before the infringement) or at the low end of 
statutory damages ($750 per book for works registered pre-
infringement94).  We will consider in Part III whether, as a consequence of 
possible new-found judicial reluctance to order injunctive relief, the 
proposed “permitted but paid” regime for certain redistributive uses may 
already be evolving, particularly in failed fair use cases. 
c. Search Engines  
A trio of decisions from California involving mass copying of 
digitized images for inclusion in an image search engine and thumbnail 
displays in response to search queries,95 presents transactions cost 
problems, not necessarily with respect to finding the right owner, whose 
locatable website the search engine will have “crawled”, but, again, 
regarding the sheer volume of works.  The announced grounds of decision, 
however, have concentrated on the public benefit and lack of economic 
impact of a “transformative use.” 96 Because the purpose of the copying 
was “transformative” in that the purpose of the original photo was 
“aesthetic”, while the search engine use was “informational,” the search 
engine use did not substitute for the author’s use (though following the 
search engine’s links could take one to clearly substitutional pirate sites).  
The rightowner had contended that the thumbnail images displayed by the 
search engine competed with the emerging market for downloading 
thumbnails to cellphones, but in Perfect 10 v Amazon the 9th Circuit ruled 
that the plaintiff had failed to prove that such a market truly was in 
prospect.  Reminded that fair use is an affirmative defense, and that the 
search engine bore the burden of showing that its thumbnails did not 
compromise that market, the court amended its opinion, but not the 
result,97 which suggests that the burden of proof did not matter because the 
court had already determined the outcome: The public benefit search 
engines offer required that the use be “fair” (and therefore unpaid) one 
way or another. 
 
                                                     
94 17 U.S.C. secs. 412, 504(c)(1). 
95 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba 
Soft Corp, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex, 2013 WL 1899851 
(N.D.Cal. 2013) 
96 The Perfect 10 court did, however, also characterize the index as a “work.” Perfect 10 
Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1165 (“[A] search engine provides social benefit by 
incorporating an original work into a new work, namely, an electronic reference tool.”) 
97 Id at 1146 (noting amendment of decision on December 3, 2007).  
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II Comparative Law: EU, Canada, Australia and NZ [query whether 
to consider Berne-TRIPs compatibility] 
The U.S. is an outlier in the broader international landscape of copyright 
exceptions.  The copyright laws of EU member states, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand do not include an all-purpose fair use defense (though 
one has been proposed in Australia), but all these States have enacted a 
panoply of copyright exceptions, many of which require remuneration.  
Thus, while our fair use doctrine confronts courts with an all-or-nothing 
choice, other countries have charted middle courses between barring the 
use and permitting its unremunerated pursuit.  Some of these measures 
correspond to specific compulsory licensees in U.S. law, for example, for 
cable retransmission.98  Others, however, cover some of my proposed zone 
of “permitted but paid” uses.  The various schemes range from 
compulsory licenses with government rate-setting to “license it or lose it” 
schemes in which an unremunerated exception will apply if the copyright 
owner fails to offer a license.  In the latter instance, the license will 
generally cover a substantial number of works, and the licensor will 
generally represent a collective of authors and/or publishers.   
But, even with arm-twisting, licensing will work only to the extent that the 
licensor has the rights to license. In the case of mass uses of works (as the 
Google Books controversy has shown in the U.S.) there may be no 
reasonably compassable number of rightholder representatives, 
particularly where copyright owners have not authorized a representative.  
The European Nordic countries have addressed this transactions cost 
problem by imposing an “extended collective license” regime, in which 
the works of unrepresented rightholders will be brought within the 
collective management society’s licensing authority once the society has 
attained a (legislatively specified) critical mass of rightholders.  More 
recently, the French legislature in 2012 devised a Google-esque solution to 
mass book-scanning, by combining an opt-out regime with collective 
licensing of the digital rights of the remaining books designated by the 
national library for scanning and republication.  Collective management of 
the grant or administration of the licenses ensures that the authors (and not 
merely the publishers or other distribution intermediaries) will receive a 
share  of the licensing revenue.  
                                                     
98
 See, e.g., Copyright Act 1968 (as amended) §135 (Austl.); Copyright Act 2012 §31 
(Can.); Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §35 (Den.); Copyright and Related Rights 
Act 2000 (as amended) §175 (Ir.); Copyright Act 1994 (as amended) §88 (N.Z.);  
Copyright, Designs, Patents Act 1988 (as amended) §73(4) (U.K.). 
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Finally, with respect to “orphan works” whose rightholders cannot be 
found despite a diligent search, the E.U. and Canada authorize certain uses 
by certain classes of users; permission may be obtained through a 
designated licensing authority.  These regimes have also addressed the 
compensation due to those rightholders who subsequently reappear.  This 
section of the article will summarize current regimes and pending law 
reform measures abroad that might inspire a U.S. “permitted but paid” 
regime. 
The regimes may be divided as follows: A. License it or lose it; B. Use 
permitted; remuneration required; C. French Law on “Unavailable 
Books”; D. Orphan works. 
A. License it or lose it 
“License it or lose it” offers one response to the transactions cost problem 
of large-scale use of copyrighted works.  The use in question will fall 
under a statutorily-specified unremunerated exception unless there is a 
collective license in place for the use and, usually, if the user was 
reasonably aware of the licensing scheme. In effect, it places the burden 
on the copyright owners to organize collective licensing of certain uses by 
making them uncompensated otherwise.  The United Kingdom and New 
Zealand currently follow this approach.  In the existing schemes and in the 
proposed scheme, these exceptions/uses are explicitly enumerated in the 
statute and noted to be unremunerated only in the absence of a licensing 
scheme.  Some of the exceptions, particularly for cable retransmissions 
and for certain uses for the benefit of the visually impaired, address uses 
which are currently the subject of compulsory licensing or an outright 
exemption in the US. 
In the United Kingdom, the scheme includes the following uses: 99  
1) recording certain broadcasts or copies of broadcasts for placement 
in non-profit archives; educational establishments recording broadcast or 
copies of broadcasts for non-commercial educational purposes;  
2) specially designated bodies making copies of broadcasts for deaf, 
hard of hearing and handicapped with subtitled modifications as needed; 
and  
                                                     
99
 Copyright, Designs, Patents Act 1988 (as amended) §§35, 74, 31 (U.K.). 
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3) making copies and published editions for personal use of visually 
impaired, including Braille editions and spoken word recordings.  
New Zealand: 100 
1) copying sound recording for instruction or relating to learning a 
language by correspondence and copying done by person giving or 
receiving lesson and no charge is made for supplying copy;  
2) copying and communication of a “communication work”101 made 
or communicated by or on behalf of or made and supplied by an 
educational resource supplier for an educational purpose;  
3) official archives playing or showing films or sound recordings so 
long as payment to view/hear no more than a reasonable contribution 
toward maintenance of archive;  
4) media monitors recording or transcribing communication work that 
consists wholly or substantially of news reports or discussions of current 
events if conditions met (parties negotiate or government sets rate but this 
does not apply if there is a licensing scheme in place); and  
5) cable retransmission of communication works. 
 The proposed changes to Australia’s copyright legislation102 include 
replacement of certain statutory licenses with either negotiated licenses or 
a newly-introduced, U.S.-inspired unpaid fair use exception.  Existing 
statutory licensing schemes currently in place for governments, 
educational institutions and institutions assisting persons with a print 
disability would all be repealed.  Under the proposed new scheme, these 
licenses should be negotiated voluntarily. However, institutions would not 
need to negotiate licenses for uses that the parties or the courts considered 
to be fair use.  
B. Use permitted; remuneration required 
                                                     
100
 Copyright Act 1994 (as amended) §§44, 48, 57, 91, 88 (N.Z.). 
101 A “communication work” includes “radio and TV broadcasts and Internet 
transmissions, separate from the films, music and other material which they contain,” 
Copyright Council of New Zealand, An introduction to copyright in New Zealand 
(January 2009) at 2, available at 
http://www.copyright.org.nz/viewInfosheet.php?sheet=29. 
102
Australian Law Reform Commission [ALRC], Copyright and the Digital Economy, 
ALRC Report 122, Feb. 13, 2014 [hereinafter ALRC Report]. 
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Here, an author may not prohibit specific enumerated uses, but she is 
entitled to equitable remuneration for these uses. In most instances, a 
collecting society is responsible for collecting and distributing 
remuneration and often is the only party who may assert a claim.  The key 
issue, of course, is how the remuneration is set.  National legislation 
discloses three variants on the theme: 1) private parties (usually collecting 
societies) voluntarily set the remuneration rate; 2) private parties set the 
remuneration rate but the government steps in to determine the rate when 
the private parties can’t agree; and 3) government requires users to obtain 
licenses from collecting societies.  The following is not exhaustive: it 
covers only some EU member states and lists only those exceptions that 
do not correspond to a compulsory license already present in U.S. law.103  
Cumulatively, the categories suggest the kinds of uses that might populate 
a U.S. Permitted but Paid regime.  
 1.  Private Parties Set Remuneration Rate  
In Austria, the author is entitled to equitable remuneration that may only 
be asserted by a collecting society for the following uses:104 
1) reproducing and distributing published individual works of language to 
extent justified by purpose (e.g. churches, schools) and also broadcasts 
designated to be school broadcasts;  
2) reproducing and distributing individual published works which by 
nature and designation intended for use in schools or teaching;  
3) libraries using video or audio media for public recitation, performance 
or presentation of works for no more than two visitors at a time and not for 
profit;  
4) schools and higher educational establishments publicly performing 
cinematographic work for purposes of teaching to extent justified (but 
does not apply to works intended for teaching); and  
5) accommodation enterprises publicly showing cinematographic works to 
guests provided that more than two years have elapsed since work’s first 
performance, performance carried out with aid of permitted audio or video 
medium and spectators admitted free of charge. 
                                                     
103 I do not here address private copying levies. 
104
 Federal Law on Copyright in Works of Literature and Art and on Related Rights 1998 
§§45, 51, 54(1)(3), 56(b)-(c) (Austria). 
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Finland: 105  
In Finland, the author has a right to remuneration for the following uses: 
1) reproducing published works by means other than sound and moving 
images for those who cannot use the works in the ordinary manner due to 
disability or illness (but government issues decree on which institutions 
are entitled to make copies to lend, sell or use); and  
2) reproducing minor parts of short published literary or artistic works for 
use in educational compilation after required years have elapsed since 
publication (but does not apply to works created for use in education). 
Germany: 106  
In Germany, the author is entitled to equitable remuneration, which in 
most instances may only be asserted by a collecting society, for the 
following uses: 
1) reproducing work for non-commercial purposes for exclusive 
distribution to persons with disabilities if reproduction is necessary for 
such access;  
2) reproducing, distributing and making available published works in non-
commercial basic and further training facilities, vocational training 
facilities, or for church use (but must communicate intent to author or 
rights holder);  
3) reproducing, distributing and communicating newspaper articles and 
broadcast commentaries and connected illustrations in newspapers and 
similar information sheets (but not required if short extracts of several 
articles or commentaries used for overview);  
4) publicly performing published work to public if serves non-profit-
making purpose of event organizer, participants admitted free of charge 
and performers unpaid (but not required to pay for events organized by 
youth, social welfare, geriatric or prisoner’s welfare); and  
5) public libraries reproducing and transmitting small parts of published 
articles by post or fax (but limitations on electronic reproduction). 
                                                     
105
 Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) §§17-18 (Fin.). 
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Lithuania: 107  
In Lithuania, the author is entitled to remuneration through compulsory 
licenses that are administered and distributed by the appropriate collecting 
society for the following uses:  
1) reproducing by reprography for non-commercial purposes published 
articles or other short work, short extract of writing with or without 
illustrations; and  
2) reproducing by reprography for non-commercial purposes work kept in 
publicly accessible libraries, educational establishments, museums or 
archives, except when over the internet, for purpose of replacement of a 
lost, destroyed, unfit-for-use copy in own or other archive or library if 
impossible to obtain by other means. 
Netherlands: 108 
In the Netherlands, the author must be paid equitable remuneration for the 
following uses: 
1) libraries and educational institutions making copies of printed works for 
their library services and for students;  
2) use for the benefit of people with a disability if the use is non-
commercial and related to the disability.  
Norway: 109  
In Norway, the author is entitled to remuneration for the following uses: 
1) copying published work to use in public examination;  
2) reproducing collective work for use in religious services or education or 
minor parts of literary/scientific works or musical works or short works if 
five years have elapsed since the expiry of the year in which the work was 
published;  
3) reproducing published works of art and photos in connection with the 
text of a critical or scientific treatise which is not of a generally 
                                                     
107
 Law on Copyrights and Related Rights 1999 (as amended) Art. 23 (Lith.). 
108
 Act of Sept.23, 1912 Containing New Regulation for Copyright (as amended) Arts. 
16h, 15j, 26a (Neth.). 
109
 Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) §§13(a), 18, 23, 23(a) (Nor.). 
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informative character when done with proper usage and to extent 
necessary to achieve desired purpose; and  
4) reproducing published works of art and photos in newspapers, 
periodicals and broadcasts in connection with reporting a current event 
(but does not apply if the current event is related to the work that is 
reproduced). 
Poland: 110  
In Poland, the author must be paid remuneration for the following uses: 
1) including excerpts from larger works or entire small works in textbooks 
and in anthologies that are collections of excerpts for scientific or 
educational purposes;  
2) centers for scientific and technical information distributing single 
copies of excerpts from published works; and  
3) reproducing published works of fine art in encyclopedias and atlases 
when attempts to contact copyright owners for permission encounter 
serious obstacles. 
Spain: 111 
In Spain, the author is entitled to equitable remuneration for the following 
uses: 
1) reproducing, distributing, and communicating works disseminated in 
mass media studies and articles on current events (unless rights expressly 
reserved). 
Sweden: 112 
In Sweden, the author must be paid equitable remuneration for the 
following uses: 
1) using by and for the disabled beyond specifically exempted thresholds; 
and  
2) distributing more than a few copies or communicating or distributing 
copies and recordings that disabled persons can retain. 
                                                     
110
 Act on Copyright and Related Rights1994 (as amended) Arts. 29.2, 30.2, 33.3 (Pol.). 
111
 Revised Law on Intellectual Property 1996 (as amended) Art. 33.1 (Spain). 
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2. Private Parties Set Remuneration Rate, Copyright Tribunals set rate if 
Parties Cannot Agree 
Australia: 113 
In Australia, the Copyright Tribunal sets the rate if private parties cannot 
agree on a rate for the following uses: 
1) reproducing articles or reasonable portion of published or unpublished 
works in electronic form by educational institutions, including visual art 
alongside text;  
2) reproducing published literary and dramatic works for the research, 
study or instruction of a person with a print disability, including in 
electronic form;  
3) copying to assist persons with intellectual disabilities if material is not 
commercially available; print disability license holders broadcasting 
published literary and dramatic works and adaptations;  
4) qualifying institution copying a broadcast, or any work, sound recording 
or film in a transmission for education for the disabled;  
5) performing sound recordings in places open to the public. 
Denmark: 114  
In Denmark, the Copyright License Tribunal sets the rate in if private 
parties cannot agree on a rate for the following uses: 
1) use of published sound recordings in broadcasts on radio and television 
and other public performances (but excluding on-demand Internet 
transmission);  
2) non-commercial use and distribution of copies of published works 
specifically intended for the blind, visually impaired, deaf and sufferers of 
speech impediments, including sound recordings of literary works for 
visually impaired (but no other sound recordings of literary or musical 
works); and  
                                                     
113
 Copyright Act 1968 (as amended) §§135, 108 (Austl.) 
114
 Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §§68, 17(1)-(3), 18 (Den.). 
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3)use of minor portions of literary and musical works or such works of 
small proportions and works of art in connection with the text in 
composite works compiling contributions by a large number of authors for 
use in educational activities provided that five years have elapsed since the 
work was published.  
Italy: 115 
In Italy, the rate is set based on criteria set out by the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers if private parties cannot agree on a rate for the 
following uses: 
1) reproducing protected works in anthologies for educational use; 
and  
New Zealand: 116 
In New Zealand, the Copyright Tribunal sets the rate in if private parties 
cannot agree on a rate for the following uses: 
librarian making copies of published editions for collections of other 
libraries 
Sweden: 117 
In Sweden, the court sets the rate if private parties cannot agree on a rate 
for the following uses: 
1) reproducing protected materials in compilations made and used for 
educational purposes. 
 When the parties cannot agree, the state may resolve the rate 
through national Copyright Boards or Tribunals.  Generally speaking, 
Copyright Tribunals seem to play the largest role in Australia, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom and Canada.  In most instances, however, 
this role remains fairly minor.  In Australia, for example, parties generally 
agree on a rate amongst themselves and the Copyright Tribunal hears 
approximately two matters per year.118  Similarly in New Zealand, 
collecting societies set rates and the Tribunal steps in when the collecting 
                                                     
115
 Law No. 633 of April 22, 1941 for the Protection of Copyright and Neighboring 
Rights (as amended) Arts. 46(3), 58, 51-59, 70(2), 60 (It.). 
116
 Copyright Act 1994 (as amended) §§54, 63 (N.Z.). 
117
 Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works 1960 (as amended) Art. 18 (Swed.). 
118 Email correspondence with Paddy Hannigan, Deputy District Registrar, Australian 
Copyright Tribunal Feb. 9, 2014. 
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society rate is challenged.  These challenges often result in interparty 
settlements and the Tribunal issues a rate only if the matter goes to a full 
hearing, which rarely occurs.119  In the United Kingdom, the Copyright 
Tribunal primarily confirms rates that private parties have agreed upon 
themselves.120 
 The Copyright Board plays the largest role in rate-setting in 
Canada, as certain collecting societies are required by law to set tariffs for 
certain uses.  Here, the collecting society publishes the tariff and parties 
are given a chance to object.  If a party does not object, the tariff is 
confirmed.  If a party does object, the Copyright Board proceeds to a 
hearing, but frequently during this process parties negotiate and agree on a 
rate amongst themselves and ask the Copyright Board to certify that rate 
six to twelve months later, before the matter goes to a full hearing. The 
Copyright Board sets the rate only when the parties cannot come to an 
agreement amongst themselves.   For uses that are not required by law to 
have a tariff, parties generally negotiate amongst themselves and may file 
the rate with the Copyright Board but are not required to do so.  On rare 
occasion, the Copyright Board may be asked to act as an arbiter or set a 
tariff with regard to these uses.121 
3. Government Requires License from Collecting Society - Extended 
Collective Licensing122 
 The Nordic countries have since the early 1960s facilitated the 
large-scale licensing of works, generally for public purposes, by 
legislation that brings works unrepresented by the relevant collecting 
society within the licensing authority of that society.  Some, but not all, of 
the statutory provisions allow rightholders to opt out of the collective 
license.  Extended collective licenses (ECL) have received considerable 
attention lately, as a possible solution to the orphan works and mass 
digitization problems.123  Scholars from the Nordic countries, however, 
                                                     
119 Email correspondence with Prof. Susy Frankel, President, N.Z. Copyright Tribunal,Mar. 3, 
2014. 
120 Email correspondence with Catherine Worley, U.K. Copyright Tribunal, Feb. 20, 2014. 
121 Phone conversation with Dr. Raphael Solomon, Director, Research & Analysis, Copyright 
Board Canada, Mar. 3, 2014. 
122 See generally Jens Schovbo and Thomas Riis, Extended Collective Licenses and the 
Nordic Experience, 33 Colum J. L. & Arts 471 (2010); Gunnar Karnell, Extended 
Collective License Clauses and Agreements in Nordic Copyright Law, 10 Colum J. L. & 
Arts 73 (1985). 
123 See generally, David R. Hansen, et al, Solving the Orphan Works Problem in the 
United States,   37 Colum. J.L. & Arts 1 (2013); Katharina de la Durantaye, Finding a 
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have expressed skepticism that the approach can be generalized to nations 
lacking the Nordic countries’ particular traditions of social organization.124  
Nonetheless, I summarize the laws’ coverage in order to give an idea of 
the kinds of uses these legislatures have determined should be permitted 
but paid. 
 ECL uses fall into a number of similar categories.  They are as 
follows: 
1) educational uses;125  
2) library and archive use;126 
3) internal use in public and/or private organization;127 
                                                                                                                                                              
Home for Orphans: Google Book Search and Orphan Works Laws in the United States 
and Europe, 21 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 229 (2011). 
124 See Schovbo and Riis, supra note 118.  
125 Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §13 (Den.) (copying published works and 
recording works broadcast on radio and TV as well as own performance for educational 
uses (does not apply to computer programs or more than brief extracts from 
cinematographic works); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) §14 (Fin.) (reproducing, 
making public and performing works for educational activities and scientific research); 
Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) §13(b) (Nor.) (copying published works and 
broadcasts for educational activities (but does not apply to broadcasts that consist of more 
than minor parts of cinematographic work); Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic 
Works 1960 (as amended) Art. 42c (Swed.) (copying works that have been made public 
for educational purposes). 
126 Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §16(b) (Den.) (public libraries digitally 
reproducing articles from newspapers, magazines, composite works, brief excerpts from 
published literary works and illustrations and music reproduced in connection with the 
text (but does not permit broadcast by radio or TV or the making available to the public 
of works in such a way that the public may access them at the place and time of their 
choosing); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) §16(d) (Fin.) (archives, public libraries, 
museums reproducing and communicating works for purposes not included in 
unremunerated exceptions); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) §16(a) (Nor.) (libraries, 
archives, museums copying and making available published works in their collections); 
Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works 1960 (as amended) Art. 42d (Swed.) 
(libraries and archives communicating single articles and short portions of works to 
library borrowers (but does not apply to computer programs) and distributing copies of 
works prepared pursuant to library exception for purposes not included in unremunerated 
exceptions). 
127 Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §14 (Den.) (public or private institutions, 
organizations and businesses copying articles, brief excerpts of descriptive published 
works or musical works and illustrations for internal use to advance their own activities); 
Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) §13(a) (Fin.) (reproducing published article and 
accompanying illustration for internal communication); Copyright Act 1961 (as 
amended) §14 (Nor.) (public and private institutions and organizations and commercial 
enterprises copying published works and broadcasts for use within their own activities 
(but does not apply to broadcasts that consist of more than minor parts of 
cinematographic work)); Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works 1960 (as 
amended) Art. 42b (Swed.) (decision-making municipal assemblies, governmental and 
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4) broadcasting published works;128  
5) television retransmission;129 
6) fixations of broadcast works for the disabled;130 
7) reproducing published works of  art;131 
 
8) public access to specified public television programs at a time and place 
chosen by the viewer.132 
                                                                                                                                                              
municipal authorities, enterprises and organizations copying published literary works and 
works of fine art published in connection with the text by means of reprographic 
reproduction in order to satisfy the need for information within their field of activities). 
128 Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §30 (Den.) (public access television companies 
broadcasting published works on radio or TV broadcast (but does not apply to satellite 
unless there is a simultaneous terrestrial broadcast); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) 
§25(f) (Fin.) (broadcasting organization transmitting a work, copying work for up to a 
year to use in its own broadcast for a maximum of four times per year (and potentially 
longer/more depending on terms of ECL)(broadcasting organization transmitting a new 
work made public if included in a TV program produced by the broadcasting 
organization and transmitted before January 1, 1985); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) 
§30  (Nor.) (broadcast organizations named by King broadcasting published work); Act 
on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works 1960 (as amended) Art. 42e (Swed.) (sound 
radio and television organizations specified by government broadcasting public literary, 
musical and fine art works (but does not apply to works made for the stage and only 
applies to transmissions via satellite if the broadcasting organization simultaneously 
carries out a broadcast through a terrestrial transmitter)). 
129 Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §35 (Den.) (simultaneous retransmission on 
cable of works broadcast wirelessly on radio or television); Copyright Act 1961 (as 
amended) §25(4) (Fin.) (retransmitting work included in radio or TV transmission for 
reception by the public simultaneously with the original transmission); Copyright Act 
1961 (as amended) §34 (Nor.) (broadcast organizations using works that are lawfully 
included in a broadcast and communicating to public by simultaneous and unaltered 
retransmission); Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works 1960 (as amended) Art. 
42f (Swed.) (transmitting or retransmitting to public, simultaneously and in unaltered 
form, by wire or wireless means, works which form part of a wireless sound radio or TV 
broadcast). 
130 Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §17(4) (Den.) (government, municipal and other 
social nonprofit institutions reproducing sound or visual recordings broadcast on TV or 
radio in a manner accessible to visually handicapped and hearing-impaired people by 
means of sound or visual recordings); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) §17(b)  (Nor.) 
(producing and using fixations for the disabled (and King may issue regulations regarding 
right to make a fixation of published film or picture with or without sound not essentially 
consisting of musical works)). 
131 Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §24(a) (Den.) (reproducing published works of 
art); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) §25(a)(2) (Fin.) (reproducing work of art in 
collection or sale for purposes other than promoting the exhibit/sale). 
132 Consolidated Act on Copyright 2010 §30(a) (Den.) (public access to state-owned 
television company productions at places and times selected by the viewer); Copyright 
Act 1961 (as amended) §32 (Nor.) (specific broadcasting organizations using issued 
works in their collections and in connection with new broadcasts and transmissions in 
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 C. French Law on “Unavailable Books” 
 The French legislature in March 2012 unanimously enacted a law 
on “unavailable books,”133  designed to make the corpus of out of print 
French books digitally available (and to offer a national alternative to 
Google Books, whose scanning program the Paris trial court had, not 
coincidentally, condemned as copyright infringement134).  The law directs 
the Bibliothèque nationale to establish a database of all works published in 
France before 2001 that are not available in print or digital forms.  The 
creation of the list derives from comparing the national library’s holdings 
with databases of commercially available books, but also includes a 
crowd-sourcing component. Every year, the national library will generate 
a new list.   
 The law vests the management of the rights in a collecting society 
whose board is composed of equal numbers of authors and publishers.  
Once the book is listed, authors and publishers have six months to oppose 
the collecting society’s management of the book.  (After six months, the 
author may nonetheless oppose on the basis of harm to her honor or 
reputation.)  If the publisher opposes, it has two years to exploit the book; 
the author incurs no corresponding obligation.    Thereafter, the collecting 
society is empowered to exercise the right to authorize the reproduction 
and communication of the book in digital form, by offering five-year 
renewable non-exclusive licenses to digitize and disseminate, subject to 
remuneration.  The law does not in fact detail how the remuneration will 
be calculated, other than to require that it be « equitably » distributed 
between authors and publishers, and that the author’s share may not be 
less than the publisher’s.135   
                                                                                                                                                              
such a way that individuals can choose time and place of access to the work (only applies 
to works broadcast before January 1, 1997 that are part of broadcaster’s own productions 
and author may prohibit use). 
133
 Loi no 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l’exploitation numérique des livres 
indisponibles du XXe siècle (1) [Law 2012-287 of Mar. 1, 2012 on the Digital 
Exploitation of Unavailable Books of the Twentieth Century], Journal Official de la 
République Française [J.O] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 2 2012, p. 3986, effective 
as of the publication of décret n°2013-182 of Feb.27, 2013 on the application of articles 
L.134-1 à L.134-9 of the Code of intellectual property.  The French Constitutional 
Council recently rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of this law, see Cons. 
constitutionnel No. 213-370 QPC, 28 Feb. 2014. 
134 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 3d chamber, Judgment of Dec. 19, 2009 
(Editions du Seuil v Google,), available at http://www.legalis.net/?page=jurisprudence-
decision&id_article=2812 
135 Code de la Propriété Intellectual, art.L.134-3 II cl. 5 et seq. (Fr.) 
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 Absent opposition, the collecting society must first offer the 
original print publisher a ten-year automatically renewable exclusive 
license to reproduce and make the work available in digital form.  The 
publisher has two months to respond, and, if it exercises this right of first 
refusal, three years to make the book available.  If the publisher does not 
exercise the right, or fails to publish digitally within 3 years, the collecting 
society will offer non-exclusive digitization and dissemination licenses to 
all comers.  The author may oppose the grant of the exclusive license to 
the original print publisher if the author proves that the publisher did not 
acquire digital rights.  The author may at any time withdraw the collecting 
society’s power to grant non-exclusive digitization licenses if the author 
proves that he or she alone held digitization rights.  And authors and 
publishers may at any time jointly withdraw the collecting society’s 
power, but the publisher must exploit the book within 18 months.  Any 
licenses the collecting society may already have granted will continue in 
force for any remainder of the five-year period covered by the grant. 
 In the case of so-called “orphan books,” the French law empowers 
the collecting society to authorize publicly accessible libraries to digitize 
and disseminate books in their collections, if after ten years from the 
inclusion of the book in the collecting society’s repertoire, the copyright 
holders have not been found notwithstanding a diligent search.  Libraries 
pay no remuneration to the collecting society, but in turn must not derive 
any economic or commercial benefit from digitizing and making the books 
available. 
 A few observations: First, the law does not create a national digital 
free lending library.  With the exception of orphan books, the law does not 
enable libraries freely to digitize and disseminate out of print books.  
Libraries could acquire non-exclusive licenses to do so, but the licenses 
must be paid for.  On the other hand, the cost of those licenses may well 
be considerably less than the cost of negotiating rights from the copyright 
owners.  It remains to be seen whether libraries would undertake the 
outlay, and, if they did, whether the free availability of digitized out-of-
print books from libraries would discourage for-profit publishers from 
entering the market. 
 Second, non exclusive licenses for exercise by libraries or others 
will be granted only if the publisher does not make the book available.  
Here, the law’s allocation of the respective rights of authors and publishers 
is problematic, and, for France, surprising.  During the first six months 
following the book’s inclusion on the Bibliothèque nationale’s database, 
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both authors and publishers may oppose the collecting society’s exercise 
of digitization rights.  The objecting publisher, however, will have to 
exploit the book within two years.  But the publisher may not have 
acquired digital rights, or the contract may be ambiguous as to the 
acquisition of rights over new modes of exploitation.  So, without making 
a deal with the author, the publisher may not be in a position to oppose the 
collecting society’s administration of digital rights.  On the other hand, if 
the publisher does not oppose, the collecting society administers the rights, 
but must first offer them, on an exclusive basis, to the publisher who holds 
the print rights.  In other words, the law gives to the publishers what they 
may not have received by contract.  In a reversal of the usual burden of 
proof regarding the scope of the author’s grant of rights, the law requires 
the author to demonstrate that she retained the rights, rather than obliging 
the publisher to prove their acquisition.  Ambiguity in the contract now 
favors the publisher.   So why should the publisher bother negotiating with 
the author for digital rights if the publisher can get those rights by transfer 
of law?  Arguably, this is expropriation, and worse, the law expropriates 
authors not for the public benefit of non-profit libraries, but for the benefit 
of for-profit publishers.  On the other hand, the authors will be paid half 
the licensing revenue; without the licensing scheme, the author would 
have derived no revenue from the books that otherwise would have 
remained out of commerce. 
 The law has now been in effect long enough for the Bibliothèque 
nationale to have published an initial list of 60,000 “unavailable” titles.  
The collecting society designated to administer the electronic rights in 
those books has received only 2500 oppositions to the listings, mostly 
from authors or publishers who claim an intention to publish a digital 
edition.136  Details concerning who undertakes the digitization, and at 
whose cost, remain to be worked out.  As does the rate-setting for the 
royalty to be paid to authors.  And it is still too early to ascertain how 
many of the original publishers will take up the collecting society’s 
invitation to prepare a digital edition. 
 The law, conceived as France’s answer to Google,137 goes a step 
beyond Nordic-style extended collective licenses because it vests the 
                                                     
136 Email from Florence Marie Piriou, counsel to Sofia, the collecting society empowered 
to administer the licenses for “unavailable books,” 7 Oct.2013. 
137 See, e.g., Franck Macrez, L’exploitation numérique des livres indisponibles : que 
reste-t-il du droit d’auteur ?, (3 April 2012), http://franck.macrez.net/?p=210 (« the 
solution that was adopted seeks to give new life to a currently neglected corpus, and to 
respond to the desire for massive digitization inspired by Google»); Société nationale de 
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management authority in a collecting society without requiring the society 
to demonstrate that it already represents most or even some of the 
rightholders.  Although the society exercises a “mandate” or 
“authorization to manage,”138 it is not the rightholders who delegate this 
authority (as with conventional collecting societies), but the State which 
confers it.  This in turn implies that the law endows the State with the 
power to grant digitization licenses in pre-2001 French-published books 
whose rightowners do not timely object or, having objected, do not timely 
publish.  The law thus also steps well beyond “opt out” in that it not only 
requires authors and publishers to declare their ownership and their 
objections in order to retain their rights, but also, at least for the 
publishers, in fact to exercise those rights, lest they be granted to other 
publishers, albeit with unspecified remuneration to the original 
rightholders.  The remuneration feature makes this an attenuated version 
of “use it or lose it.”  It is, for France, a country long wed to a highly 
“propertarian” concept of copyright,139 a rather radical reworking.  It is 
also unlikely the legislature, in its haste to institute a national program of 
book-scanning, thought through the broader implications of vesting the 
State with the authority to direct digital exploitations of out of print books 
(or effectively to transfer the author’s digital rights to the publishers).140 
  However conceptually problematic, the French law does offer 
another model of permitted-but-paid.  One that short circuits the 
                                                                                                                                                              
l’édition,  Numérisation des livres indisponibles, http://www.sne.fr/dossiers-et-
enjeux/numerique/numerisation-des-livres-indisponibles.html (genesis of the law was to 
respond to Google Books’ digitzation strategy) ; .  See also Lionel Maurel, De la loi sur 
les indisponibles au registre ReLIRE : la blessure, l’insulte et la réaction en marche (24 
March 2013), http://scinfolex.com/2013/03/24/de-la-loi-sur-les-indisponibles-a-la-base-
relire-la-blessure-linsulte-et-la-reaction-en-marche/ (« Far from having done better than 
Google, France has employed exactly the same dubious procedures as the search engine, 
with the same consequences »)  
138 Florence Marie Piriou, Nouveau régime légal des livres indisponibles du XXe siècle 
(unpublished paper on file with author) (« Il ne s’agit ni d’une exception ni d’une cession 
légale de droits mais plutôt d’un mandat légal » ; « At issue is neither an exception nor a 
statutory transfer of rights, but rather a legal mandate (authorization). »).  
139 For example, the first article of the copyright section of the Code de la Propriété 
Intellectual, L. 1-111, declares (“L'auteur d'une oeuvre de l'esprit jouit sur cette oeuvre, 
du seul fait de sa création, d'un droit de propriété incorporelle exclusif et opposable à 
tous.” ; “The author of a work of authorship enjoys in that work, by the sole fact of its 
creation, an incorporeal and exclusive property right which may be asserted against all”). 
140 The French law may also clash with international norms limiting copyright exceptions 
and limitations.  Because these apply only to foreign works, however, the legislature has 
sought to avoid the problem by limiting the law’s application to works first published in 
France. To the extent that those works may include translations of foreign authors’ 
works, the legislation may still be vulnerable to challenge for violation of TRIPs art 13 
(should any foreign government seek to bring such a challenge). 
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difficulties of assembling rightholders into a collecting society, or of 
extending that society’s authority to represent non members.  And which 
may produce some revenue for the authors of books now lying fallow.  It 
is also clear that any initiative of this scope would require legislative 
intervention; private ordering on this scale is not an option.141 
D. Orphan works  
 In 2012, the EU issued a Directive regarding orphan works to 
permit public libraries and non-profit national broadcasters to disseminate 
works of authors and rightholders who cannot be located following a 
diligent search.142  The Directive requires payment of “fair compensation” 
to rightowners who reappear and “put an end” to the work’s “orphan” 
status.143  Because member states have until October 29, 2014 to 
implement the Directive,144 however, only the UK and Hungary currently 
present examples of compensation schemes.  On the other hand, Canada 
has long established a licensing program for works whose rightholders 
cannot be found.145  
1. E.U. 
 The Directive gives member states considerable leeway in 
addressing the rights of reappearing rightholders.  Art 6(5) provides that 
“Member States shall be free to determine the circumstances under which 
the payment of such compensation may be organised.”146  Currently, with 
an October 29, 2014 deadline to transpose the Directive into national law, 
only the U.K. and Hungary have adopted remuneration schemes, 
a. U.K. 
 The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, 2013 c. 24, 
section 77, “licensing of copyright and performers' rights,” adds a new 
orphan works provision, sections 116A-116D.  The legislation 
                                                     
141 Cf. Authors Guild v Google, supra (scale of proposed settlement inappropriate to 
private ordering). 
142 Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Oct.2012 
on certain permitted uses of orphan works, OJEU L 299/5 (27 Oct.2012). 
143 Id. art. 6(5) and recital 18. 
144 Id., art. 9(1). 
145 The Canadian Copyright Board’s issued its first decision in this regard in 1990. 
MacLean Hunter Ltd. File 1990-3 (Aug. 24, 1990), available at http://www.cb-
cda.gc.ca/unlocatable-introuvables/licences-e.html  
146 The same article states that the level of compensation will be determined by the law of 
the member state whose public institution made the use; by contrast, a work’s “orphan” 
status is determined according to the law of the work’s country of origin, see art. 3(3). 
 
46 
contemplates a licensing regime that may be administered, pursuant to 
regulations, by a state authority and/or through extended collective 
licensing.  The scheme appears to anticipate that the license fees will be 
paid in before any missing rightholder reappears to claim compensation, 
because the law directs the establishments of regulations to resolve the 
treatment of unclaimed sums paid under the license.147 
a. Hungary 
 Hungary anticipated the Orphan Works Directive by regulations 
adopted in 2009.148  Like the U.K., Hungary has also based its orphan 
works regime on up-front licensing, but the sole entity empowered to grant 
licenses appears to be the Hungarian Patent Office.  The HPO also rules 
on the withdrawal of licenses in the event the author becomes known; the 
HPO will also determine the extent of the remuneration due to the 
author.149  
 2. Canada 
 Canada's orphan works provisions set out a regime for all potential 
uses of orphan works.   Section 77 of the Copyright Act permits the 
Copyright Board of Canada to issue a non-exclusive license (subject to 
any terms the Board establishes) for use in Canada to a user whose 
reasonable efforts to locate a copyright owner have been 
unsuccessful. Section 77 applies to a published work, to a fixation of a 
performer's performance, published sound recording or a fixation of a 
communication signal in which copyright subsists. The CBC may grant a 
non-exclusive license to engage in a broad range of acts.150   
 
 The CBC will grant a license only if the user can show that s/he 
made every reasonable effort to find the copyright owner. There is no 
definition of "reasonable effort" in §77 and no formal standards have been 
established by CBC regulation to date (though the legislation permits the 
CBC to create the standard).  Each licensing decision is usually issues 
within 30-45 days.  In setting the license fee, the CBC generally bases the 
                                                     
147 See id. sec. 116C (4): 
The regulations must provide for the treatment of any royalties or other sums paid in 
respect of a licence, including— 
. . .  
(c) the treatment of sums after that period (as bona vacantia or otherwise). 
148 100/2009 (V. 8) Korm. rendelet az a´rva mu¨ egyes felhaszna´la´sainak 
engede´lyeze´se´re vonatkozo´ re´szletes szaba´lyokro´l (Government Regulation on the 
Detailed Rules Related to the Licensing of Certain Use of Orphan Works), arts. 2(1), 
2(2), 3 (Hung.), available at http://www.hipo.gov.hu/English/jogforras/100_2009.pdf. 
149 Id. arts. 7, 8. 
150 See Copyright Act 2012 §77 (Can.).  
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rate on what the collecting society that would normally represent the 
rightholder charges for the type of use in question, and then orders that 
royalties be paid directly to that collecting society (the system assumes 
that every class of rightholder will have a corresponding collecting 
society).151  Under §77, the subsequently appearing copyright owner may 
collect the royalties fixed in the license no later than five years after its 
expiration The CBC allows collective societies to dispose the royalties as 
it sees fit for the general benefit of its members but the society undertakes 
to reimburse any person who establishes, within 5 years after the expiry of 
the license, ownership of the work covered by the license.152  
 
III Proposal for US copyright reform: Legislation in aid of Private 
Ordering 
A. To what extent do we already have “Permitted but paid”? 
 If, rather than excusing altogether some socially beneficial or 
market failure non authorship uses of copyrighted works, requiring 
payment for them would be desirable, how might we achieve that end?  In 
the first place, we should inquire to what extent we already have Permitted 
but Paid regimes.  Some of these exist in the form of statutory compulsory 
licenses.  Others may be emerging as a result of judicial reluctance in the 
wake of eBay v. MercExchange, to grant injunctive relief.  Fuller 
examination suggests, however, that the Supreme Court’s decision has not 
lead to a generalized substitution of damage awards (judge-made 
compulsory licenses) in lieu of injunctions. 
1. Extant compulsory license regimes  
The 1976 copyright act institutes compulsory licenses for 
mechanical rights (creation of sound recordings of non dramatic musical 
compositions for distribution of phonorecords to the public) (sec. 115); 
cable and satellite retransmissions (secs. 111, 119); non-interactive digital 
performances of sound recordings (sec 114.); public broadcasting (sec. 
118); and jukeboxes (sec. 116).  The statute also favors negotiated 
solutions in lieu of administrative rate-setting,153 and accordingly provides 
                                                     
151 Phone conversation with Dr. Raphael Solomon, Director, Research & Analysis, 
Copyright Board Canada, Mar. 3, 2014A list of CBC licenses can be found at: 
http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable-introuvables/licences-e.html.  CBC refusals to 
grant an unlocatable right owner can be found at: http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable-
introuvables/denied-refusees-e.html 
152 See http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable-introuvables/brochure2-e.html. 
153 See 17 U.S.C. secs. 803(b)(3) (three-month voluntary negotiation period following 
initiation of CRB rate-making proceeding); 805 (“General rule for voluntarily negotiated 
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in several instances for antitrust exemptions to enable industry-wide 
licensing negotiations; the compulsory licenses serve as back stops should 
private ordering fail.154 The statute creates a Copyright Royalty Board to 
set the rates; a CRB proceeding can be both lengthy and expensive.155  A 
recent Copyright Office study acknowledges that “Proceedings may 
involve numerous interested parties and often take two years or longer to 
complete.  The CRB process allows for significant discovery, including 
document production and depositions, though it is not as broad as 
discovery permitted under the Federal Rules. Trials before the CRB, 
relatively formal in nature, typically involve multiple expert and nonexpert 
witnesses and voluminous economic evidence, and can last several 
weeks.”156  Moreover, since rates may require revision over time, the 
statute also provides a schedule for revisiting prior rate settings.157  
Compulsory licenses have been criticized as excessively cumbersome and 
insufficiently responsive to technological and market evolutions.158  
                                                                                                                                                              
agreements”).  Of the ratemakings published in the Federal Register (which include those 
that settle and those that do not), nine have settled prior to the CRB's final independent 
determination, while seven have not. (The CRB was created in 2004, and the first final 
rule promulgated by the CRB was in 2007).  
154 See id. § 114, 115(c)(3)(B), 116, 118; see also (describing inter-industry agreement 
and settlement on § 115 rates). 
155 See id. §. 803, 804 (setting out CRB proceedings in extensive detail).  Regarding the 
cost and duration of CRB proceeding, see, e.g. Determination of Rates and Terms for 
Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, concluded 
Spring 2013. Music Choice's written statement alone in this case constituted 1,671 pages. 
It is available at http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2011-1/. Sirius XM's statement in 
the same proceeding was 1,689 pages.  Copyright royalty hearings can involve extensive 
expert testimony as well. In 2009's Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate 
Determination Proceeding, involved dozens of witnesses' testimony from three interested 
parties at initial hearings and as part of rebuttal testimony; see 74 FR 6832 (Feb. 11, 
2009), available at http://www.loc.gov/crb/fedreg/2009/74fr4510.pdf#page=2. 
With respect to duration of a ratemaking proceeding, a contested ratemaking takes 
roughly two years; ratemakings with early settlements usually take less time, often 
around one year or even less.  For the 2011 Determination of Rates and Terms for 
Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services (section 114 
ratesetting for 2013--17), the ratemaking commenced on January 5, 2011 with notice in 
the Federal Register, and was concluded February 14, 2013. 
156 Copyright Small Claims: A Report of the Register of Copyrights 63 (September 
2013), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/  
157 See, e.g., 17 USC sec. 801(b)(2) (adjustment of rates for cable retransmissions); 
804(b)(4)("A petition described in subsection (a) to initiate proceedings under section 
801(b)(1) concerning the adjustment or determination of royalty rates as provided in 
section 115 may be filed in the year 2006 and in each subsequent fifth calendar year, or at 
such other times as the parties have agreed under section 115(c)(3) (B) and (C)."). 
158 See, e.g., Robert Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 
Colum. L. Rev. 2655, 2669 (1994) (speculating that compulsory license regimes “may 
prevent the creation of technological and organizational innovations that would 
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2. The effect of eBay: Will failed fair use defenses yield only 
monetary remedies (de facto permitted-but-paid)?  
 While statutory compulsory licenses govern only those situations 
expressly designated by Congress, judge-made compulsory licenses (some 
even authorized in the Copyright Act159) could introduce desirable 
flexibility more broadly.  The Ninth Circuit in Universal City Studios v. 
Sony Corp. of America, having found the use of the videotape recorder to 
record off-air television programming to infringe, posited a “continuing 
royalty” in lieu of an injunction.160  (How judges would set the rate, and 
whether undertaking such a task would be desirable is another matter.161)   
Arguably, the Supreme Court’s ruling in eBay v MercExchange, 
that irreparable harm should not be presumed upon proof of patent 
infringement, will chasten judges in all intellectual property infringement 
cases, and will lead to fewer grants of injunctive relief in copyright 
infringement cases as well.162  Withholding injunctive relief would set the 
stage for inter-party negotiations, though it could also considerably reduce 
the bargaining power of the copyright owner who can no longer wield a 
credible threat to compel the defendant to cease its activities. 
 A review of post eBay copyright cases, however, indicates that 
denial of preliminary or permanent injunctive relief in copyright cases 
falls far short of general or systematic.163  With respect to permanent 
injunctions, only five of 23 cases studied through 2013 withheld injunctive 
relief, despite plaintiff’s success on the merits, and with one exception, 
                                                                                                                                                              
effectively administer the rights-clearing process.”); Paul Goldstein, Copyright, Law & 
Contemp. Probs. Spring 1992, at 79, 84. 
159 17 U.S.C. sec 104A (d)(3)(B)  
160 659 F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir. 1981), rev.’d. 646 U.S. 417 (1984) (“when great public 
injury would result from an injunction, a court could award damages or a continuing 
royalty. This may very well be an acceptable resolution in this context.”) 
161 Cf. Benjamin Petersen, Injunctive Relief in the Post eBay World, 23 Berkeley Tech. 
L. J. 193 (2008) (surveying patent cases and contending that judicial rate-setting is 
undesirable). 
162 See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (reading eBay to apply to 
copyright infringement cases; the case involved an unsuccessful fair use defense to the 
publication of an unauthorized sequel to The Catcher in the Rye).  For a critical view of 
eBay and its likely impact in copyright cases, see, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden 
& Henry E. Smith,  The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution?  The Test for 
Permanent Injunctions, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 203 (2012). 
163 See Jairui Liu, Copyright Injunctions After eBay: An Empirical Study, 16 Lewis & 
Clark L. Rev. 215 (2012) (analyzing cases to 2010).  For a review of post-eBay awards 
(or withholding) of injunctive relief in intellectual property cases generally, through 
2013, I thank Trey Brewer, Columbia Law School class of 2014. 
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none involved a finding of likely future infringement.164  Regarding 
preliminary injunctions, only three of ten decisions found a likelihood of 
success on the merits, but declined to find sufficient irreparable harm to 
warrant injunctive relief.165  Thus, looking to the courts to implement 
Permitted but Paid by withholding injunctive relief to copyright owners 
whose substantive claims have succeeded does not seem a likely course. 
B. How much can one achieve by private ordering without 
legislation?  Is court-ordered “license it or lose it” an answer? 
 On the other hand, the prospects may look different if the court 
makes success on the merits turn on the offer of a license, as did the 
district court in Cambridge University Press v. Georgia State 
University.166  The impact on the copyright owner’s bargaining position 
may be less substantial than first appears, at least where the plaintiff was 
seeking to be paid for the use rather than to prevent it altogether, because a 
defendant who declines a reasonable license may be subject to an award of 
substantial statutory damages, as well as injunctive relief.167  But the 
                                                     
164 See Christopher Phelps & Associates, LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(Irreparable harm shown, as well as inadequacy of monetary damages, but balance of 
hardship and public interest not proven); Magna-RX, Inc. v. Holley, CV05-3545-PHX-
EHC, 2008 WL 5068977 (D. Ariz. Nov. 25, 2008) (plaintiff failed to give any evidence 
regarding irreparable harm, possibly in mistake belief that irreparable harm was 
presumed after a finding of infringement); Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Ltd. P'ship, 
CIV.A. MJG-08-397, 2011 WL 5445947 (D. Md. Nov. 9, 2011) (no irreparable harm 
shown because the logo which the Ravens unlawfully used had no commercial value 
other than its use by the Ravens; the judge ordered the two parties to negotiate a licensing 
agreement---the only post eBay copyright decision so far to have ordered negotiation);  
Bean v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., CV 11-08028-PCT-FJM, 2012 WL 1078662 (D. Ariz. 
Mar. 30, 2012) (no irreparable harm in this case because plaintiff---a photographer---
could not prove the likelihood of future infringement. The books which unlawfully 
contained his photographs were out of print); Brighton Collectibles, Inc. v. Pedre Watch 
Co., Case No.: 11cv00637 AJB (WVG) (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2013) (no irreparable harm 
because no proof of likely future infringement and inadequate proof of reputational 
harm).   
165 See, Bethesda Softworks, L.L.C. v. Interplay Entm't Corp., 452 F. App'x 351 (4th Cir. 
2011) (district court was unconvinced by plaintiff’s showing of irreparable harm);  Frerck 
v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (photographer gave a 
limited license to a textbook publisher to publish his photos; the terms of the license were 
exceeded by the textbook publisher. Court found damages constituted sufficient relief in 
light of industry practice of retroactive licenses covering uses not originally bargained or 
paid-for): Grant Heilman Photography, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 
316 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (very similar to Frerck). 
166 Supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (analyzing the “license it or lose it” 
approach of the Georgia State court). 
167 Statutory damages are available if the work was registered with the Copyright Office 
prior to its infringement, 17 U.S.C. sec. 412; professional publishers tend systematically 
to register.  Of course, no damages, statutory or actual, may be awarded against a state 
entity, such as Georgia State University, see Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid 
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problem of assessing whether the license the plaintiff offered was 
reasonable may thrust courts back into the rate-making business, to which 
generalist federal judges may be less well-suited than the specialized 
Copyright Royalty Board.   
C. Legislation to enable private ordering?   
 If full-blown administrative ratemaking is too expensive and takes 
too long, but license-it-or-lose-it presents the problem of excessive judicial 
intervention (or, conversely, for those judges disinclined to second-guess 
proposed licensing fees, excessive deference to copyright owners), 
perhaps a simplified ratemaking procedure could provide a happy 
medium.  In addition, the procedure should be designed to ensure that 
authors share equally in the remuneration. I envision a combination of two 
models, one based on voluntary negotiation of licenses, inspired by a 
proposed amendment to section 114 of the copyright act’s provision on 
compulsory licenses for non interactive digital transmission of sound 
recordings;168 but backed up by Copyright Royalty Board-administered 
last-best-offer, or “baseball,” arbitration.  With respect to the latter 
solution, it is necessary also to consider the institutional setting for the rate 
determinations as well as the application of baseball arbitration to the 
copyright context.  Finally, any provision for a “backstop” of 
administrative ratemaking should also contain a “sunset” clause requiring 
legislative renewal every five years (otherwise the ratemaking 
authorization expires), in order to promote a transition to market licensing 
in the event that changing conditions make such licensing feasible. 
 At the threshold, however, we need to identify the uses to which 
the proposed regime would apply.  Recalling our two categories of fair 
uses which, I have contended, should not remain uncompensated, there are 
non profit public library and educational uses which have in effect 
benefitted from fair use as social subsidy.  And there are uses, generally 
massive in scope, for which market licensing solutions have not yet been 
devised.  Our review of comparative law reveals that remuneration 
schemes involving voluntary or state-supported licensing mechanisms 
generally correspond to these broad categories.  But a principal difference 
between the United States and most other countries studied is the 
prevalence of collective licensing societies outside the US.  Indeed, as the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (Lanham Trademark Act); Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) 
(Patent Act). 
168 H.R. 3219, 113th Cong. (2013-14) (“Free market royalty act”). 
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French legislation on mass digitization of books illustrates, 
implementation of the scheme required the creation of a collecting society 
dedicated to administering the licenses.169  Apart from the fields of public 
performance rights in non dramatic musical compositions, where ASCAP 
and BMI collectively license users large and small (and operate under 
antitrust consent decrees170), and, to a lesser extent, reprographic and 
digital reproduction rights in books licensed by the Copyright Clearance 
Center, collective management of authors’ rights is far less pervasive here 
than in most other copyright-producing countries.  As a result, unless new 
collective management societies emerge, or unless the major rightholders 
of particular kinds of repertory may combine without antitrust constraints 
to offer licenses across the repertory,171 implementation of voluntary 
licensing mechanisms is likely to encounter daunting transactions costs.  
Moreover, where multiple users comprise the class of potential licensees it 
may also be necessary to consider how the class may be represented in the 
negotiations.172  State-supported backstops to voluntary licensing can of 
course relieve the antitrust constraints on rate-setting (as is already the 
case for certain compulsory licenses173), but those solutions take us out of 
the realm of private ordering, and into legislation to establish an 
administrative framework to offer a rate-setting mechanism that is faster, 
cheaper, and, to the extent possible, closer to market solutions than the 
current panoply of compulsory licenses affords. 
1.  H.R. 3219 “Free Market Royalty Act” 
                                                     
169 Supra Part II.C.  Similarly, the rejected Google Books settlement would have created a 
“Book Rights Registry” collecting society to grant licenses to digitize out of commerce 
books and to distribute the collected monies to authors and publishers. The Authors Guild 
v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 671-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
170 17 U.S.C. sec. 115(c)(3)(B). 
171 See, e.g., Sound Exchange, a society representing sound recording producers and 
performers, that collects and distributes the compulsory license royalty for non interactive 
webcasting under sec. 114.  See http://www.soundexchange.com/about/  
172 For example, in setting the license fees for public performances of non dramatic 
musical compositions by bars and restaurants, ASCAP and BMI negotiate with the 
restaurateurs’ trade association, see, e.g., Legislative Information & Representation, 
Minn. Restaurant Ass’n, 
http://www.hospitalitymn.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=85#BMI (last 
visited Apr. 27, 2014) (noting that members of Minnesota Restaurant Association receive 
BMI music license with discounted rates, though each member must still obtain 
individual license). In the royalty negotiations for video-programing licenses, small cable 
operators may designate a Bargaining Agent, see In re DIRECTV Sports Net Pittsburgh, 
LLC v. Armstrong Utilities, Inc., CSR-8480-P (FCC, Aug. 31, 2011). discussed infra. 
173 See supra note 155 and accompanying text (describing antitrust exemptions in extant 
compulsory licesing regimes).  
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 In 1995 and again in 1998, Congress amended the copyright act to 
implement a digital public performance right in sound recordings.  The 
legislation distinguished interactive from non interactive digital 
transmissions, subjecting the latter to compulsory licensing.  The regime 
directed the equal division of the proceeds of the compulsory license 
among record producers and performers.174  The statutory provisions also 
permitted copyright owners and webcasters to reach private agreements on 
license rates;175 as a result, many performers may not in fact receive an 
equal share of the licensing revenues.176  An amendment proposed in 
December 2013, the “free market royalty act,”177 would, among other 
                                                     
174 17 U.S.C. sec. 114(f),(g)(2); see generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for 
the “Digital Millennium”, 23 Colum.-VLA J. L. & Arts 137, 166-70(1999) (describing 
and analyzing 1995 and 1998 amendments). 
175 17 U.S.C. sec. 114(f)(3). 
176 See Kristelia A. García, Private Copyright Reform 4 (GW Law School Public Law 
and Legal Theory Paper No. 2013-121, 2013) (“These private content licensing 
agreements circumvent both the statutory license and relevant collective rights 
organization . . . and in so doing, . . . potentially alter the rights and entitlements of non-
parties in several significant ways,” including “deny[ing] artist royalty payments to which 
they are legally entitled.”); see also Ben Sisario, Sirius’s Move to Bypass a Royalty 
Payment Clearinghouse Causes an Uproar, N.Y. Times (Nov. 6, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/07/business/media/siriuss-move-to-bypass-royalty-
agency-causes-uproar.html (noting that private agreements “could result in less money 
and more complications for artists,” largely due to a lack of clarity as to how the author 
receives payment); Musicians’ Digital Performance Royalties at Risk, Future of Music 
Coalition, http://futureofmusic.org/blog/2011/10/28/musicians-digital-performance-
royalties-risk (last visited Apr. 27, 2014) (arguing that direct licenses can hurt performers 
because they may not receive direct payments, could be paid less, will not be part of 
negotiations, and could be forced to accept licenses allowing for more expansive use of 
their music).   
177 H.R. 3219 provides in relevant part: 
 
(e) EFFICIENCY OF LICENSING.—   
 
(1)  COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATION FOR NON- INTERACTIVE SERVICES.—
Pursuant  to  section 106(6),  and  notwithstanding  any  other  provision  of  law,  any  
noninteractive  services  performing  sound  recordings  publicly  by  means  of  an  audio  
transmission  may  collectively  negotiate  and  agree  to  royalty  rates  and  license  
terms  and  conditions  for  the  performance of such sound recordings.   
 
(2)  ONE-STOP LICENSING FOR NONINTERACTIVE SERVICES.—   
(A)  NEGOTIATION OF LICENSES BY COMMON AGENT.—Pursuant  to  section  
106(6),  and  notwithstanding  any  other  provision  of  law,  for  licenses  for  
noninteractive  audio  transmissions,  SoundExchange, Inc., or any successor entity is  
designated  as  the  sole  common  agent  to  negotiate, agree to, pay, and receive 
payments under  this section. If a license for noninteractive audio transmissions  is  
agreed  to  by  such  common agent,  copyright  owners  of  sound  recordings may  
subsequently  negotiate  and  agree  to  royalty rates and license terms and conditions 
with any  noninteractive  services  performing  sound recordings publicly by means of an 
audio transmission  for  the  performance  of  such  sound  recordings.   
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things, replace the current compulsory license regime for non interactive 
digital transmissions with licenses covering digital negotiated between a 
“common agent” representing the copyright owners (currently Sound 
Exchange) and a collective representative of the webcasters.  The 
negotiations would proceed “notwithstanding any other provision of law,” 
and therefore would be exempt from antitrust constraints.  The amendment 
preserves current section 114’s even division of the proceeds of the license 
between producers and performers, but importantly makes the performers’ 
share mandatory by requiring that the webcaster  pay the common agent 
50% of the royalties the webcaster owes under the license, and further 
instructing that the common agent “shall distribute” those payments to the 
performers. 
 The proposed amendment also establishes a compulsory license 
“backstop for public and non commercial stations” in the event that 
                                                                                                                                                              
(B)  DIRECT PAYMENT AND EQUAL COMPENSATION.—The  common  agent  
under  sub-paragraph  (A)  shall  make  distributions  directly  to  the  following  
recipients  from  payments  collected under this section as follows:   
(i)  50  percent  shall  be  paid  to  the  copyright owner.   
(ii)  45  percent  shall  be  paid  to  featured recording artists.   
(iii)  5  percent  shall  be  paid  to  nonfeatured  musicians  and  vocalists  (through  the 
American Federation of Musicians and  Screen  Actors  Guild-American  Federation of 
Television and Radio Artists Intellectual Property  Rights  Distribution  Fund,  or  their 
successors).   
(f)  PAYMENTS FROM INDIVIDUAL LICENSES FOR  NONINTERACTIVE 
AUDIO TRANSMISSIONS.—In  the  case  of  a  license  granted  by  the  copyright  
owner  of  a  sound  recording to a noninteractive service performing sound recordings 
publicly by means of an audio transmission, such service  shall  pay  to  the  common  
agent  described  in  subsection  (e)  receipts  from  the  licensing  of  such  transmissions  
in  an  amount  equal  to  50  percent  of  the  total royalties  and  other  compensation  
that  the  service  is  required to pay for such transmissions under the applicable license  
agreement.  Such  common  agent  shall  distribute such payments in proportion to the 
distributions provided in  clauses  (ii)  and  (iii)  of  subsection  (e)(2)(B),  and  such 
payments shall be the sole payments to which featured and  nonfeatured  artists  are  
entitled  by  reason  of  such  transmissions under the license with that service. 
(g)  BACKSTOP FOR PUBLIC AND NONCOMMERCIAL  STATIONS.—   
(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF RATES AND TERMS.—  If royalty rates and license terms 
and conditions for  the  audio  transmission  or  retransmission  of  a  non-subscription  
broadcast  consisting  solely  of  non-commercial  educational  and  cultural  radio  
programs are  not  negotiated  and  agreed  upon  collectively under subsection (e) 
between the common agent and a noncommercial educational broadcast station funded  
on  or  after  January  1,  1995,  under  section 396(k)  of  the  Communications  Act  of  
1934  (47 U.S.C. 396(k)), a proceeding under chapter 8 of this title  shall  determine  the  
rates  and  terms  for  such transmissions  and  retransmissions.  The  Copyright Royalty 
Judges  shall  establish  such  rates  and  terms that most clearly represent the rates and 
terms that would  have  been  negotiated  in  the  marketplace  between  a  willing  buyer  
and  a  willing  seller.  In  determining such rates and terms, the Copyright Royalty 
Judges  shall  base  their  decision  on  economic,  competitive,  and  programming  
information  presented  by  the parties. 
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royalty rates and license terms “are not negotiated and agreed upon  
collectively under subsection (e) between the common agent and a 
noncommercial educational broadcast station . . .”   In that case, the 
Copyright Royalty Board will set rates that are supposed to emulate 
willing buyer-seller marketplace rates, but one may suppose that the 
failure of the parties to agree on a license means that the rates are likely to 
fall short of true market rates.  The proposed amendment does not specify 
whether the CRB-designated royalty will be shared equally among 
producers and performers, but that may be implicit. 
 The “free market royalty act” offers an attractive template for 
Permitted but Paid licenses.  By suspending antitrust constraints, and by 
encouraging the development of a user-side collective complement to the 
copyright interests’ “common agent,” the bill would stimulate bilateral 
industry-wide agreements, thus reducing transaction costs.  Were this 
approach to be generalized to sectors in which copyright owner-author 
common agents are less prevalent (or non existent) it would be necessary 
to foster the creation of such bargaining entities.  The mandatory set-aside 
for creators is another very appealing feature. 
 But what if the collective representatives fail to agree?  Should the 
“backstop” measures of the “free market royalty act” also be generalized, 
not only to non commercial users (subsidy uses), such as non profit 
libraries and educational institutions, but to all?  Is it justified to extend the 
“backstop” to commercial users if the basis of their “Permitted but Paid” 
license is market failure, given that an amendment inspired by the “Free 
Market Royalty Act” would make bargaining easier by allowing the 
aggregation of owners and users and negotiation through respective 
representatives?  If these devices effectively cure market failures, then a 
compulsory license backstop would not be warranted.  Moreover, were 
compulsory licensing an option should negotiations fail, actors who 
believe they have more to gain from a compulsory license regime than 
from a negotiated license might not bargain in good faith.  Finally, a CRB 
proceeding is currently both expensive and time-consuming.178 
Accordingly, whomever the beneficiaries of compulsory license fall-back, 
the current regime might also warrant some modifications.  The technique 
of last best-offer arbitration might prove adaptable to the task. 
 2. Baseball Arbitration: Institutional Constraints 
                                                     
178  See supra notes 153—55 and accompanying text.  
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 Before addressing how a last-best-offer “backstop” would apply to 
copyright licenses, it is necessary to confront possible constraints on 
Congress’ power to amend the Copyright Act to compel the parties to 
submit to binding arbitration. 
The Copyright Royalty Board is an arm of the Copyright Office, 
which is a branch of the Library of Congress.  The CRB already is 
empowered to set rates for the various compulsory licenses set out in the 
copyright act; the proposed scheme, albeit what one might call 
“ratemaking light,” seems well within the Board’s attributions.  Because 
copyright is federal statutory subject matter, and “the claim at issue 
derives from a federal regulatory scheme,”179 copyright claims can 
reasonably be described as claims involving “public rights” suitable for 
adjudication by non-Article III tribunals.180  With respect to the 
appointments clause, CRB judges have already been held “inferior 
officers” terminable at will by their “head of department” (in this case, the 
Librarian of Congress), and therefore their appointments do not violate 
separation of powers.181 
Because the proposed regime relies on binding and compulsory 
arbitration, the scheme exceeds the bounds imposed by the Administrative 
Procedure Act.  Without an amendment to the Copyright Act to mandate 
arbitration in relevant cases, the Library of Congress’ power to administer 
arbitrations would be limited to what the APA allows: all arbitrations 
would require the consent of both parties, the arbitrators would be agreed 
                                                     
179 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011) characterizing public rights cases as “cases 
in which the claim at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which 
resolution of the claim by an expert government agency is deemed essential to a limited 
regulatory objective within the agency's authority.” 131 S.Ct. at 2613. 
180 Cf. Report of the Register of Copyright, Copyright Small Claims, supra, at 40--41 
(“Because the rights and remedies for copyright are fixed by Congress pursuant to an 
overarching statutory scheme . . . at least some types of small copyright claims should be 
amenable to non-Article III resolution.”).  The Supreme Court’s decisions in Thomas v. 
Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568 (1985) and Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011) 
suggest that a copyright licensing dispute would be properly cast as a public rights case, 
and that agency-administered arbitration would be appropriate. Indeed, the particular 
statute in question in Thomas v. Union Carbide involved the constitutionality of a 
Congressional statute which selected binding arbitration (with limited judicial review) as 
the means for dispute resolution for participants in a federal pesticide registration 
scheme. 473 U.S. at 573-75.   
181 Intercollegiate Broadcasting System v. Copyright Royalty Board, 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012), following Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (2010), which 
barred “double for-cause removal.” 
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upon by both parties, and the parties would have to agree on all issues 
submitted to the arbitrator.182  
By contrast, specific statutory provisions can confer the requisite 
authority.  For example the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act allow for the FCC and Department of the 
Interior, respectively, to authorize arbitration upon the request of only one 
party during negotiations.183  The statute does not need to specify the type 
of arbitration used by the agency; the agency is at liberty to promulgate 
rules developing its own procedures for arbitration. For example, FCC 
rules promulgated pursuant to the Telecommunications Act instruct that 
“An arbitrator, acting pursuant to the Commission's authority under 
section 252(e)(5) of the Act, shall use final offer arbitration,” subject to 
carefully delineated exceptions.184  
2. How Baseball Arbitration Could Apply to “Permitted but Paid”   
To assess how a baseball arbitration fall-back could apply to a 
“permitted but paid” regime in copyright law, it may help to look to 
experience in the Federal Communications Commission.  The FCC 
context admittedly differs from the licenses posited here, because the FCC 
has employed baseball arbitration as a condition on authorizing the merger 
of cable operators: when the merger would otherwise result in conferring 
                                                     
182 See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 575(a)(1) (decision to arbitrate must be voluntary on the part of all 
parties to the arbitration; Sec. 575(a)(1)(A) and (B) (any party can limit the issues it 
agrees to submit to arbitration; this could mean that  a party may refuse to arbitrate unless 
the decision is limited to a range of outcomes); Sec. 577(a) (the parties to an arbitration 
are entitled to participate in selecting an arbitrator; this could result in naming arbitrators 
who are not CRB judges). 
183 See 47 U.S.C. § 252(b); 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv). 
184 47 C.F.R. § 51.807.   
In 2001, the Senate proposed amending title 49 of the United States Code to authorize the 
Secretary of Transportation to mandate baseball-style arbitration in the case of labor 
disputes between an air carrier and its employees---the Secretary could forestall a strike 
by compelling the parties to submit to binding baseball-style arbitration. See Airline 
Labor Dispute Resolution Act of 2001, S. 1327, 107th Cong. (2001). This bill ultimately 
died in committee. 
Finally, the timing of the arbitration may carry Seventh Amendment implications.  If a 
copyright holder and would-be licensee fail to agree voluntarily upon a price for a 
license, but seek administrative dispute resolution in lieu of initiating an infringement 
action, there would appear to be no constitutional impediment to pursuing an 
administrative remedy.  If, however, arbitration were sought after the filing of an 
infringement action, the Supreme Court’s decision in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures 
Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1997), that litigants in a copyright dispute are entitled to a 
trial by jury, even when statutory damages (a seemingly “public” right conferred by 
Congress) are the only damages sought, might entitle either party to resist the 
administrative procedure on the ground that the court action triggers that party’s right not 
only to a judicial rather than administrative remedy, but to a jury trial as well. 
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too much power over video programming, the operator must license the 
programming to local carriers at a reasonable rate. Baseball arbitration 
provides the means by which the FCC sets that rate. 
If the contexts are by no means identical, they are arguably 
analogous: the impetus for U.S. courts to find fair use in many of the 
social subsidy or market failure contexts for which licensing mechanisms 
exist in other countries is to prevent the copyright law from conferring 
power over content to the unreasonable prejudice of certain public services 
or technological advances.  (Because the essence of copyright - as a 
property right - is control over the exploitations comprised within the 
statutory exclusive rights, the author’s or rightholder’s control over 
content remains in most cases the appropriate objective of the copyright 
system; the prejudice that a mandatory arbitration system offsets must 
therefore be unreasonable.)   
A fundamental principle behind baseball-style arbitration is to 
encourage private ordering and incentivize settlement. By requiring the 
arbitrator to select one of two proposed offers, baseball arbitration urges 
the parties to avoid extremes by confronting them with the risk that the 
arbitrator will accept the other party’s offer.  The academic literature 
differs on whether baseball-style arbitration does successfully push parties 
toward more “reasonable” offers, though what empirical data there is 
seems to suggest that offers do converge.185  
In addition, this arbitration mechanism could at least in part avoid 
the extensive economic and market analysis required in “willing 
buyer/willing seller” ratemaking in order to determine the proper market 
rate. “Willing buyer/willing seller” ratemaking, as currently administered 
by the Copyright Royalty Judges, involves presentation of written and 
testimonial direct evidence and rebuttal testimony, legal briefing, 
                                                     
185 Academic studies of final-offer arbitration in the context of public-sector union 
negotiations indicate that the procedure does indeed encourage settlement. See Elissa A. 
Meth, Note, Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution In Domestic and 
International Disputes, 10 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 383 (1998).  For the original baseball 
context, see Jonathan M. Conti, The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major League 
Baseball, 5 Sports Law. J. 221, 232—34 (1998) (suggesting that MLB’s arbitration 
procedure has “achieved its goal” of “getting the parties to either settle their cases prior to 
arbitration, or at least to submit figures that are within the same ballpark.”). Josh 
Chetwynd notes that while labor relations theorists endorse the view that final-offer 
arbitration encourages convergence in the parties’ proposals, decision scientists often 
disagree. Josh Chetwynd, Play Ball? An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration, Its Use in 
Major League Baseball and Its Potential Applicability to European Football Wage and 
Transfer Disputes, 20 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 109, 116 (2009). Chetwynd acknowledges, 
however, that “empirical data had indicated that convergence was often occurring.” Id.  
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arguments of counsel, and judicial review.186 As a result, the most recent 
ratemaking took over five years from the initial notice-and-comment 
period until the Judges’ final determination.187  
Admittedly, some final-offer arbitration mechanisms are similarly 
expensive and time-consuming. For example, the FCC proceedings 
described above often produce large expenses for both parties arbitrating, 
and though it is supposed to take place over a short period of time (30 
days from notice to arbitration decision, and then 30 days for a decision 
from the FCC, if a party appeals), parties are allowed to alter the time 
limits as they see fit.188 Others, such as the procedure in Major League 
Baseball, are relatively speedy and efficient.189  
Another issue concerns disparities in bargaining power.  Final-
offer arbitration appears to diminish parties’ inherent bargaining disparity 
in the baseball context, as well as in the case of public-sector employee 
unions. In Major League Baseball, one recent study indicated that the 
players (the labor side) were successful in 42% of arbitration proceedings 
that went to a final hearing.190 For public-sector unions, one study 
examined New Jersey cases and found the party with weaker bargaining 
power---the unions---won roughly two-thirds of the time.191 This evidence 
                                                     
186 See Determination of Royalty Rates for Digital Performance Right in Sound 
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 79 Fed. Reg. 23,102, 23,103 (April 25, 2014).  
187 Id. at 23,102.  
188 FCC, Memorandum Opinion and Order, In the Matter of Applications of Comcast 
Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC Universal, Inc. For Consent to Assign 
Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees (Jan. 20, 2011), app. A at 129 (“The parties 
may agree to modify any of the time limits set forth[in the arbitration rules] . . . .”). 
189 See Jonathan M. Conti, The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major League Baseball, 5 
Sports Law. J. 221, 228-29 (1998) (describing annual two-month window for arbitration 
proceedings in Major League Baseball).  
190 Amy Farmer et. al., The Causes of Bargaining Failure: Evidence from Major League 
Baseball, 47 J.L. & Econ. 543, 562 (2004).  However, that author attributes these 
outcomes to the players being less risk-averse than owners in such negotiations, and 
consequently more often on the losing side, see id. at 562 (“We find that players tend to 
exhibit greater aggression than clubs and that ultimately players fare worse when their 
aggression leads them to arbitration. Our evidence also suggests that players learn, 
because previously eligible players fare slightly better than do those in first-time 
negotiations.”). 
191 Orley Ashenfelter and David E. Bloom, Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and 
Evidence, National Bureau of Economic Research (unpublished working paper), at *16 
(1983). Ashenfelter and Bloom credited this victory rate to more reasonable, risk-averse 
offers submitted by the New Jersey unions. For a more recent study, see Orley 
Ashenfelter & Gordon B. Dahl, Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and 
the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration 2 (Princeton 
Law & Public Affairs, Working Paper No. 04-009, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=559188 (finding that the “spread” between the two offers 
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suggests that parties in a relatively weak bargaining position can 
nevertheless succeed in baseball—style arbitration simply by avoiding risk 
and submitting reasonable bids.  Moreover, designation of a “common 
agent” to represent a group of weaker parties may further reduce the 
bargaining disparities. 
Conclusion 
Fair use has gone off the rails with the transformation of 
"transformative use" from a factor fostering new creativity to one favoring 
new copyright-dependent business models and socially beneficent 
reiterative uses.  We should cease muddling authorship-grounded fair uses 
with judge-made exceptions whose impetus derives from distinct 
considerations.  I have, moreover, suggested that those exceptions should 
not always produce free passes.  Instead, I have proposed a middle ground: 
many of the current social subsidy fair uses and market failure fair uses 
should be "permitted but paid."  This article has recommended 
implementing that proposal through statutorily-facilitated bargaining 
between agents representing copyright owners and users, backed up by 
last best-offer arbitration before the Copyright Royalty Board.  Whichever 
method employed to set the rates for Permitted but Paid uses, the 
copyright law should ensure that authors share in any statutory or 
privately-ordered remuneration scheme. Were “Permitted but Paid” an 
option, we would not be lured by a dichotomy falsely pitting authors 
against a perceived social good: The licensing mechanism would allow 
both broader dissemination and provide payment to authors.  For many 
redistributive uses, “Permitted but Paid” should replace fair use for free. 
                                                                                                                                                              
decreased from over 2% to less than 1% over a period of roughly 20 years, suggesting 
that parties do indeed converge on offers over time.  
